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PRIVACY, MASS INTRUSION, AND THE MODERN DATA
BREACH
Jon L. Mills* & Kelsey Harclerode**
Abstract
Massive data breaches have practically become a daily occurrence.
These breaches reveal intrusive private information about individuals, as
well as priceless corporate secrets. Ashley Madison’s breach ruined lives
and resulted in suicides. The HSBC breach, accomplished by one of their
own, revealed valuable commercial information about the bank and
personal information about HSBC customers. The employee responsible
for the breach has since been convicted of aggravated personal espionage,
while third-party news outlets have been free to republish the hacked
information.
Some information disclosed in data breaches can serve a public
purpose. The Snowden disclosures, for example, revealed sensitive
government information and were also crucial to public policy debate, a
significant amount of disclosed information is destructive to individuals
and companies alike, and often has little, if any, public value.
The conflict between publicly important disclosures and disturbing
private intrusions creates a direct confrontation between freedom of
expression and privacy. A full analysis of this confrontation requires
assessment of the specific circumstances of breach—from the
vulnerabilities present beforehand to the aftermath when the media,
companies, and individuals all must cope with the information exposed.
This analysis begins by evaluating the importance of information in
modern society. Big data is now an inescapable part of our culture. A data
breach may contain intimate details about medical conditions or national
security secrets. The disclosure of either has its own kind of devastating
effect. Examples of the impact of a mass data breach include the hacking
of Target Corporation, Yahoo! Inc., Home Depot, Inc., Sony Corporation,
Anthem Inc., HSBC Private Bank (Suisse), SA, and
AshleyMadison.com. A dissection of these breaches reveals a common
theme—the ineffectual legal system, which provides little protection or
remedy for any party involved. Several factors—including the anonymity
of hackers, outdated legal remedies, and free speech protections for thirdparty publishers—together create an uncertain and uncharted legal
landscape.
* Jon L. Mills, Dean Emeritus, Professor of Law, and Director of Center for
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After evaluating the available statutory and common law remedies,
this Article posits that reinvigorated private causes of action can be a
starting point for developing stronger legal remedies for those damaged
in a breach. The right facts and legal arguments can create new remedies
out of existing legal doctrines. Further, public values on protecting
privacy are in flux. More protective policies in the European Union
demonstrate that privacy and free expression can coexist. Some EU
policies may provide examples of legislative options. Corporate entities
and individuals are at risk and are suffering real harm in a world with
daily data breaches and ineffective laws. The need for new perspectives
is urgent.
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INTRODUCTION

We live in an increasingly intrusive world. Even when we share our
data with trustworthy entities, our privacy is still at risk due to the
enhanced possibility of data hacks and breaches. Modern data breaches
exist at the intersection of technology, modern culture, and human frailty.
The rate of change is rapid and not easily predictable. Policy makers from
almost every sector and level of government are trying to keep up with
improving technology and more skilled hackers. Beyond general tensions
between rapidly developing technology and slow-moving laws, data
breaches present a direct confrontation between two of society’s most
fundamental of rights: the freedom of expression and the right to privacy.
The man behind the largest data breach in the financial sector’s
history, Hervé Falciani, is hailed as a whistleblower by some and
regarded as a thief by others. His tale of international intrigue highlights
the drama and massive scope of the modern data breach.
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Falciani, a computer analyst for HSBC Private Bank Suisse, obtained
and leaked upwards of 30,000 company files that contained information
regarding $120 billion in assets from more than 100,000 clients across
203 countries.1 The leak exposed client lists, irregularities in financial
patterns, as well as the private financial information of thousands of
customers.2 After fleeing Switzerland, Falciani shared his information
with French officials and the media. A French newspaper passed it along
to the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) to
assist in organizing and disseminating the data.3 Meanwhile, Falciani was
arrested in Geneva, fled to France, and was ultimately detained in Spain.4
He now lives as a fugitive in France.5 Though his leak allowed several
countries to recover billions of dollars in back taxes, Falciani reportedly
has not received any payment for his disclosures.6 Still, the Swiss
government believes Falciani was unjustly enriched by his actions and a
Swiss court agreed.7 Falciani was convicted of aggravated industrial
espionage and sentenced to five years in jail.8 While Falciani endured
international legal repercussions for spearheading this leak, the thirdparty media sourcesmediated by ICIJhave been free to republish the
leaked material without legal consequence, including information about
private individuals.9
When publicly important information is revealed, often private
information that wounds innocent individuals and corporations is
exposed as well. The harm done to innocent parties wrapped up in public
disclosures highlights the need to balance free speech with individual
privacy rights. The HSBC breach represents just one of the thousands of

1. David Leigh et al., HSBC Files Show How Swiss Bank Helped Clients Dodge Taxes and
Hide Millions, GUARDIAN (Feb. 8, 2015, 4:00 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/
business/2015/feb/08/hsbc-files-expose-swiss-bank-clients-dodge-taxes-hide-millions;
HSBC
Bank “Helped Clients Dodge Millions in Tax,” BBC (Feb. 10, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/
news/business-31248913.
2. Leigh et al., supra note 1.
3. Id.
4. Profile: HSBC Whistleblower Herve Falciani, BBC (Feb. 9, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31296007.
5. Patrick Radden Keefe, The Bank Robber, NEW YORKER (May 30, 2016),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/05/30/herve-falcianis-great-swiss-bank-heist.
6. Bill Whitaker,
The Swiss Leaks, CBS NEWS (Feb. 8, 2015),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/hsbc-swiss-leaks-investigation-60-minutes.
7. Juliette Garside, HSBC Whistleblower Given Five Years’ Jail over Biggest Leak in
Banking History, GUARDIAN (Nov. 27, 2015, 12:47 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/news/
2015/nov/27/hsbc-whistleblower-jailed-five-years-herve-falciani.
8. Id.
9. Leigh et al., supra note 1.
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massive data breaches that have become everyday headlines.10 Despite
an elevated frequency of modern data breaches, the law has simply not
caught up.
Data breaches present themselves to a corporate general counsel as a
tornado of legal issues. The loss of data does not result in one or two
academic doctrinal problems that can be attacked like a law school final
exam. The issues can include: trademark law, privacy law, First
Amendment law, insurance law, tort law, negligence, contract law,
securities law, violations of data security laws of other countries, labor
law, federal agency data security violations, criminal law, shareholder
liability, attorney–client privilege, and board liability. This list is not
exhaustive, and it is impossible to predict the exact combination of legal
issues that will arise after a particular breach. What is known is that these
issues must be addressed immediately. A company may face a class
action lawsuit, a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) enforcement action,
a State Attorney General investigation, or all of the above. To ensure
success, all potential post-breach issues must be addressed as quickly as
possible. There is a reason general counsel lose sleep over data breaches.
While this law is evolving and unpredictable, this Article seeks to
provide a primer on the modern data breach. It would be thoughtless,
however, to contend that this Article provides a complete primer on the
issue. In just the time between the Florida Law Review accepting this
Article and the final edits, our country experienced dramatic
transformations at the federal level, including at the executive branch and
two of the most central agencies entrusted with establishing data
protection standards, and Equifax revealed that a data breach exposed the
information of 145.5 million Americans. The latter occurred in the final
weeks of editing. Both of the events reveal the true challenge in
protecting against and responding to a data breach during an era of
technological upheaval: the law may never be able to catch up.

10. See, e.g., Zack Whittaker, 2017’s Biggest Hacks, Leaks, and Data Breaches – So Far,
ZD NET (Sept. 20, 2017), http://www.zdnet.com/pictures/biggest-hacks-leaks-and-data-breaches2017/; Data Breaches Increase 40 Percent in 2016, Finds New Report from Identity Theft
Resource Center and CyberScout, IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CENTER (Jan. 19, 2017),
http://www.idtheftcenter.org/2016databreaches.html; Peter Elkind, Inside the Hack of the
Century, FORTUNE (June 25, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://fortune.com/sony-hack-part-1/; Andy
Greenberg, Hack Brief: Yahoo Breach Hits Half a Billion Users, WIRED (Sept. 22, 2016, 12:15
PM), https://www.wired.com/2016/09/hack-brief-yahoo-looks-set-confirm-big-old-data-breach/;
Dan Munro, Data Breaches in Healthcare Totaled over 112 Million Records in 2015, FORBES
(Dec. 31, 2015, 9:11 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danmunro/2015/12/31/data-breaches-inhealthcare-total-over-112-million-records-in-2015/#67efbf4b7b07; Robin Sidel, Target to Settle
Claims over Data Breach, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 18, 2015, 5:10 PM), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/target-reaches-settlement-with-visa-over-2013-data-breach-1439912013; see also infra
Section I.B.
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This Article will explore the legal and social conflicts inherent in
publicly important disclosures and private intrusions. Part I provides an
overview of the importance of information as it relates to the modern data
breach. Part II reviews the most common patterns among these intrusions.
Part III analyzes the federal and state standards for data security and how
these standards shape the options for the breached companies and
exposed individuals. Part IV examines the private causes of action
available after a breach occurs. Part V compares the data security law in
the United States with that of the European Union with an emphasis on
the transition to the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in May
2018. Finally, Part VI offers suggestions for how corporations and
individuals can best respond to the current states of data security law.
I. DATA BREACH IN THE INFORMATION AGE
Chief Justice John Roberts recently wrote, “[A] cell phone search
would typically expose to the government far more than the most
exhaustive search of a house.”11 The prospect of a hacker cracking your
cell phone’s code to retrieve information about your communications,
medical records, GPS locations, contacts, stored financial records,
photos, appointments, or Google search history is downright frightening.
Exposing digital data and metadata may provide a fuller and more
intimate and intrusive invasion of privacy than a walk through your
bedroom. In light of this new reality, smart phones must receive the same
constitutional protections that the drafters of the Fourth Amendment
afforded to the sanctity of the private home.
High-profile government data breaches have acted as a catalyst for
discourse on data security. In 2013, the Edward Snowden disclosures
prompted national and international scrutiny of the National Security
Agency (NSA)’s data collection practices.12 Recognizing the leak’s
dramatic effect on public dialogue about government intrusion does not
prevent an equally important discussion about the disclosure’s
intrusiveness to individuals. Accordingly, the debate over whether
Snowden should be regarded as a “whistle blower” or a traitor is still
ongoing.13
In 2016, a group of Russian hackers used a spear phishing attack to
breach the email account of John Podesta, the chairman of Hillary
11. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014).
12. Snowden’s legacy continues with another NSA data breach reportedly conducted by a
contractor of NSA consulting company, Booz Allen Hamilton. Jo Becker et al., N.S.A. Contractor
Arrested in Possible New Theft of Secrets, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/06/us/nsa-leak-booz-allen-hamilton.html.
13. See AFTER SNOWDEN: PRIVACY, SECRECY, AND SECURITY IN THE INFORMATION AGE
(Ronald Goldfarb ed., 2015).
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Clinton’s 2016 presidential campaign.14 This initial intrusion, the original
publication of the emails on Wikileaks, and the subsequent republication
of the emails on almost every news site imaginable played a substantial—
but largely immeasurable—role in Donald Trump’s defeat of Hillary
Clinton in November 2016.15 The Kremlin’s involvement in the 2016
election and President Trump’s knowledge of such involvement has since
dominated coverage of his first seven months in office and will likely
continue to plague his presidency.16
Politically motivated intrusions and leaks are not a new trend. In 1971,
Daniel Ellsberg leaked portions of the Pentagon Papers to the press.17 One
year later in 1972, former President Richard Nixon’s aides broke into and
bugged the Democratic National Committee’s headquarters at the
Watergate Hotel.18 These disclosures—new and old—demonstrate the
dramatic impact that data security has on the individual and society at
large.
When information is stolen or misappropriated, the result is frequently
characterized as a “data breach.”19 Data can take on many different
meanings. Sensitive data is generally afforded greater legal protection,
and includes financial, educational, and medical records, as well as
personally identifiable information (PII), business information, and
location data.20 Data can be most easily broken down into two types:
“metadata” and “content.” Metadata is the information about the content
data.21 For example, the body of an email is the content and the subject
14. See Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, How Hackers Broke into John Podesta and Colin
Powell’s Gmail Accounts, MOTHERBOARD (Oct. 20, 2016, 9:30 AM)
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/mg7xjb/how-hackers-broke-into-john-podesta-andcolin-powells-gmail-accounts.
15. See Harry Enten, How Much Did Wikileaks Hurt Hillary Clinton?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT
(Dec. 23, 2016, 5:01 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/wikileaks-hillary-clinton/.
16. See Silvia Amaro, Russia Scandal Could Dog Trump’s Presidency for Years, Political
Analyst Says, CNBC (July 17, 2017, 5:55 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/17/russiascandal-could-dog-trumps-presidency-for-years-political-analyst-says.html.
17. The New York Times published three articles detailing Daniel Ellsberg’s leak of the
Pentagon Papers before the Nixon administration sought to enjoin The New York Times and The
Washington Post from publishing information and analysis of the Pentagon Papers. See David W.
Dunlap, 1971 Supreme Court Allows Publication of Pentagon Papers, N.Y. TIMES (June 30,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/30/insider/1971-supreme-court-allows-publication-ofpentagon-papers.html.
18. See Carl Bernstein & Bob Woodward, FBI Finds Nixon Aides Sabotaged Democrats,
WASH. POST (Oct. 10, 1972), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/fbi-finds-nixon-aidessabotaged-democrats/2012/06/06/gJQAoHIJJV_story.html.
19. Margaret Rouse, Data Breach, TECHTARGET, http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/
definition/data-breach (last updated May 2010).
20. For a discussion of federal and state laws that protect sensitive information, see infra
Part III.
INFO.
PROJECT
(Mar.
21,
2006),
21. Metadata
Definition,
LINUX

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2017

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 3

778

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

line, origin, and destination of the email is metadata. Both forms are
vulnerable to a breach,22 and the information itself carries varying levels
of intimacy, which may be intensified when aggregated. While the
content of your medical records may seem more private than the
corresponding metadata, uncovering a complete log of the appointment
times of one’s health visits (metadata) is no less of a Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) violation than the exposure
of the reason for a person’s health visit (content).
Despite the interconnectivity of data and the overarching implications
of privacy in all aspects of life today, the United States primarily
compartmentalizes the regulation of data security by each defined
sector.23 For example, the legal standards for protecting health data are
different from the standards for protecting education data. Regardless of
the sector, metadata is often less protected than content under current
legal doctrine. Courts have traditionally held that while there is an
expectation of privacy in the content of a telephone call, the metadata
about that telephone call is not private.24 The common analogy in support
of this view is that the return address and address on an envelope are not
considered private while the contents of the envelope are.
This analysis undervalues metadata. Collected in the aggregate or over
a broad span of time, metadata can reveal as much about a person as
content.25 Innovative technologies help entities collect massive amounts
of metadata nearly constantly, while sophisticated analytic tools allow
detailed evaluations.26 One well known example of metadata collection
and analysis is the NSA’s bulk data collection and analysis program,
which has undergone significant legal scrutiny following the Snowden

http://www.linfo.org/metadata.html.
22. How to Extract Metadata from Websites Using FOCA for Windows, NULL BYTE (May
28, 2016), http://null-byte.wonderhowto.com/how-to/hack-like-pro-extract-metadata-fromwebsites-using-foca-for-windows-0155076/.
23. There are more than fifty privacy related federal laws. See, e.g., Fair Credit Reporting
Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012); Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), 15
U.S.C. §§ 6501–05 (2012); Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), 20 U.S.C.
§ 1232g (2012); The Common Rule, 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (2010); Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA), 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (2010).
24. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979) (holding that metadata pertaining to
phone numbers dialed was not protected under the Fourth Amendment because it was available
to the phone company).
25. Joe Coscarelli, Metadata Can Be More Revealing Than Your Actual Conversations,
N.Y. MAG. (June 7, 2013, 1:03 PM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2013/06/metadatawhats-in-your-phone-records.html.
26. See Sara Schwartz, 9 Ways You’re Being Spied on Every Day, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr.
3, 2014, 12:28 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/04/03/government-surveillance
_n_5084623.html.
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disclosures.27 Judge Richard J. Leon, in a ruling that the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia ultimately reversed for a lack of
standing, aptly commented, “Records that once would have revealed a
few scattered tiles of information about a person now reveal an entire
mosaic—a vibrant and constantly updating picture of the person's life.”28
The legal system’s slow progression towards recognizing the importance
of metadata is but one of the many challenges within privacy law.29
A. Corporate Data Breaches
As part of their business model, modern corporations collect, store,
use, create, and disseminate information constantly—and are thus made
vulnerable to a third party stealing or misappropriating that information.
Corporate data can be as routine as an employee’s weekly work schedule,
or as unique as the formula for Coca Cola. In 2016, documented incidents
of data breaches reached an all-time record high of 1,093, leaving more
than 36 million records exposed.30 Based on data through June 2017, one
estimate suggests that this figure will rise by 37% by the end of 2017.31
Consistent with these numbers, 64% of American adults report having
experienced their personal data compromised in a breach.32 A
corporation’s public reputation and economic value may be profoundly
damaged in a breach, as well as the reputations, finances, and personal
lives of the individuals associated with the breach. When users of the
27. See Jack Goldsmith, Reflections on NSA Oversight, and a Prediction That NSA
Authorities (and Oversight, and Transparency) Will Expand, LAWFARE (Aug. 9, 2013, 7:52 AM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/reflections-nsa-oversight-and-prediction-nsa-authorities-andoversight-and-transparency-will-expand; see also Kelsey Harclerode, How USA Freedom
Impacts Ongoing NSA Litigation, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (June 23, 2015),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/06/how-usa-freedom-impacts-ongoing-nsa-litigation.
28. Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 36 (D.D.C. 2013), vacated and remanded, 800
F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
29. The ability for long-term surveillance and the subsequent collection of data to
eventually reveal significant insight about one person when put together is often referred to as the
“mosaic theory.” In United States v. Jones, two concurring opinions signed or joined by five of
the Supreme Court justices supported the notion that long-term surveillance triggers Fourth
Amendment protection. 565 U.S. 400, 413–17 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); Id. at 429–31
(Alito, J., concurring); see also United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir.
2010) (using the phrase “mosaic theory” to describe the fact that “[p]rolonged surveillance reveals
types of information not revealed by short-term surveillance, such as what a person does
repeatedly, what he does not do, and what he does ensemble”).
30. IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., DATA BREACH REPORTS: 2016 END OF YEAR REPORT 2
(2017), http://www.idtheftcenter.org/images/breach/2016/DataBreachReport_2016.pdf.
31. At Mid-Year, U.S. Data Breaches Increase at Record Pace, IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE
CTR. (July 18, 2017), http://www.idtheftcenter.org/Press-Releases/2017-mid-year-data-breachreport-press-release.
32. Kenneth Olmstead & Aaron Smith, Americans and Cybersecurity, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan.
26, 2017), http://www.pewinternet.org/2017/01/26/americans-and-cybersecurity/.
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cheating-enabling website Ashley Madison were exposed through a leak,
many marriages were dissolved, public figures ridiculed, and, tragically,
multiple people committed suicide.33 Clearly, the real-life implications of
a data breach can be severe, and the harms can extend beyond the
immediate consequences of the thief’s initial exposure.
B. Examples of Corporate Data Breaches
The following cases across different industries demonstrate the
importance of data security, the need for concrete remedies for
individuals harmed in a data breach, and the general security patterns that
emerge throughout the life cycle of data management.
1. Target
Because Target failed to identify the lax security of a subcontractor,
the company became the victim of a sophisticated hacking attack that left
40 million customers’ debit and credit cards exposed and an additional
70 million customers’ nonfinancial personal information stolen.34 In the
aftermath, Target’s CEO resigned, the company settled a massive
consumer class action lawsuit for $18.5 million,35 and the company lost
approximately $148 million due to a drastic decline in consumer trust.36
Target also agreed to pay $39.4 million to the banks and credit unions
that sued Target for the costs incurred to reimburse fraudulent charges
and issue new credit and debit cards to Target’s consumers.37
2. Yahoo!
In September of 2016, Yahoo, the internet search engine, mail
provider, and content platform, revealed that the company had
33. Sara Malm, Two Suicides Are Linked to Ashley Madison Leak: Texas Police Chief Takes
His Own Life Just Days After His Email Is Leaked in Cheating Website Hack, DAILY MAIL (Aug.
24, 2015, 5:08 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3208907/The-Ashley-Madisonsuicide-Texas-police-chief-takes-life-just-days-email-leaked-cheating-website-hack.html; Laurie
Segall, Pastor Outed on Ashley Madison Commits Suicide, CNN MONEY (Sept. 8, 2015, 7:10 PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2015/09/08/technology/ashley-madison-suicide/.
34. Rachel Abrams, Target to Pay $18.5 Million to 47 States in Security Breach Settlement,
N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/23/business/target-securitybreach-settlement.html.
35. Id.
36. Samantha Sharf, Target Shares Tumble as Retailer Reveals Cost of Data Breach,
FORBES (Aug. 5, 2014, 9:16 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/samanthasharf/2014/08/05/targetshares-tumble-as-retailer-reveals-cost-of-data-breach.
37. Jonathan Stempel & Nandita Bose, Target in $39.4 Million Settlement with Banks
Over Data Breach, REUTERS (Dec. 2, 2015, 9:16 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-targetbreach-settlement/target-in-39-4-million-settlement-with-banks-over-data-breach-idUSKB
N0TL20Y20151203.
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experienced a massive breach two years prior in which 500 million users’
PII, encrypted passwords, and in some cases security questions were
hacked by a “state-sponsored actor.”38 Just three months later, the
company disclosed a separate, and even greater, hack that compromised
the accounts of more than 1 billion users.39 As a result of the double
breaches, Yahoo lost profits in its pending acquisition deal with Verizon.
In March of 2017, the U.S. Justice Department indicted two Russian spies
and two criminal hackers on charges of hacking, wire fraud, trade secret
theft and economic espionage in connection to the earlier Yahoo breach.40
The Justice Department’s indictment of foreign cybercriminals is
consistent with U.S. government’s recent strategy of issuing economic
sanctions against foreign governments in the aftermath of cyber attacks,
as seen against North Korea in the Sony case,41 and Russian officials after
interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.42
3. Home Depot
In 2014, hackers deployed malware that infected the Home Depot
payment systems, and 56 million customers’ credit cards were exposed.43
It reportedly took five months for the company to become aware of the
attack.44 Following the breach, Home Depot faced a daunting class action
lawsuit that ultimately led to a $19.5 million settlement.45
4. Sony Pictures and Entertainment
In November 2014, Sony, the global entertainment company,
experienced a sweeping data breach that revealed a massive amount of
intellectual property and sensitive personal information.46 In the weeks
38. Nicole Perlroth, Yahoo Says Hackers Stole Data on 500 Million Users in 2014, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/23/technology/yahoo-hackers.html.
39. Vindu Goel & Nicole Perlroth, Yahoo Says 1 Billion User Accounts Were Hacked, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/14/technology/yahoo-hack.html.
40. Ellen Nakashima, Justice Department Charges Russian Spies and Criminal Hackers in
Yahoo Intrusion, WASH. POST (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/justice-department-charging-russian-spies-and-criminal-hackers-for-yahoo-intrusion/
2017/03/15/64b98e32-0911-11e7-93dc-00f9bdd74ed1_story.html?utm_term=.4169dbd11053.
41. See discussion infra Subsection I.B.4.
42. See Nakashima, supra note 40.
43. Melvin Blackman, Home Depot: 56 Million Cards Exposed in Breach, CNN (Sept. 18,
2014, 5:56 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/09/18/technology/security/home-depot-hack/.
44. Id.
45. Jonathan Stempel, Home Depot Settles Consumer Lawsuit over Big 2014 Data Breach,
REUTERS (Mar. 8, 2016, 2:10 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-home-depot-breachsettlement-idUSKCN0WA24Z.
46. See Andrea Peterson, The Sony Pictures Hack, Explained, WASH. POST (Dec. 18, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/12/18/the-sony-pictures-hackexplained/.
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following the public disclosure of the breach on November 24, the
hackers released 38 million files in eight individual batches.47 These files
included salacious content, such as emails between executives and
celebrities.48 The leaked intellectual property included unreleased movies
and unfinished manuscripts.49 The estimated twenty-five gigabytes of
sensitive and/or confidential employee data released included passwords,
private keys, personal health information, social security numbers, home
addresses, bank account information, workers compensation details,
performance reviews, retirement plan information, and criminal
background checks.50 Sparking international intrigue and igniting debates
concerning the intersection of national security and the First Amendment,
many believe that North Korea perpetrated the breach to deter the release
of The Interview, a comedic film that featured an assassination of North
Korea’s leader.51 Following the breach, Sony fired several executives and
also agreed to pay $2–4.5 million to settle a class action lawsuit brought
by employees whose personal records were exposed in the breach.52
5. Anthem Health Insurance
The healthcare sector has been the target of several massive hacks, a
trend that is predicted to continue due to the high value of personal
medical information.53 In 2015, questionable internal storage encryption
led to the theft of nearly 80 million personal records from Anthem, a large
medical insurance company.54 The hackers targeted PII like social
security numbers, email addresses, and birthdays.55 The fifty plus class
actions suits filed against Anthem also raised concerns over potential

47. See, e.g., Elkind, supra note 10.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. David E. Sanger & Martin Fackler, N.S.A. Breached North Korean Networks Before
Sony Attack, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/19/
world/asia/nsa-tapped-into-north-korean-networks-before-sony-attack-officials-say.html?_r=0.
52. Jody Godoy, Sony to Pay up to $4.5M to Settle Employee’s Breach Suit, LAW360 (Oct.
20, 2015, 4:00 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/716417/sony-to-pay-up-to-4-5m-to-settleemployees-breach-suit.
53. 2017 Data Breach Industry Forecast, EXPERIAN (2017), http://www.experian.com/
assets/data-breach/white-papers/2017-experian-data-breach-industry-forecast.pdf.
54. Bruce Japsen, Hackers Stole Data on 80 Million Anthem Customers. Why Wasn't
It Encrypted?, FORBES (Feb. 6, 2015, 8:45 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
brucejapsen/2015/02/06/anthem-didnt-encrypt-personal-data-and-privacy-laws-dont-require-it/.
55. Id.
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HIPAA violations since the breach included medical IDs.56 In 2017,
Anthem settled the consumer claims for $115 million.57
6. HSBC Finance Corporation
This hack of a global bank by an employee revealed intimate financial
information about thousands of the bank’s international clients, some of
whom were notable business leaders and public figures.58 Not only did
this hack bring HSBC data security practices under scrutiny, but several
of the individual customers are now under criminal investigation for
information brought to light in the disclosure.59
7. Ashley Madison
An anonymous hacker groupself-named The Impact
Teamhacked into the online cheating website and threatened to release
the stolen information if the owners did not permanently shut down the
site.60 When the website owners did not meet their demands, the hackers
uploaded around thirty gigabytes of stolen data onto the dark web.61 This
data dump exposed the personal account information of the site’s users,
as well as maps of the company’s internal servers, financial data, and
employee salary information.62 Thus far, two suicides have been linked
to the hack,63 the CEO has resigned,64 and exposed users have filed a
$576 million class action suit against the owners of Ashley Madison.65
56. Joseph Conn, Legal Liabilities in Recent Data Breach Extend Far Beyond Anthem,
MOD. HEALTHCARE (Feb. 23, 2015), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20150223/
NEWS/302239977/legal-liabilities-in-recent-data-breach-extend-far-beyond-anthem.
57. Pamela A. Maclean, Anthem Agrees to $115 Million Settlement Over Data Breach,
BLOOMBERG (June 23, 2017, 5:45 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-0623/anthem-reaches-115-mln-settlement-in-massive-data-breach-case.
58. See David Leigh et al., HSBC Files: Why the Public Should Know of Swiss Bank’s
Pattern of Misconduct, GUARDIAN (Feb. 8, 2015, 4:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
business/2015/feb/08/hsbc-files-public-right-to-know-swiss-operation-leaked-data.
59. Id.
60. Brian Krebs, Online Cheating Site AshleyMadison Hacked, KREBS ON SECURITY (July
15, 2015), http://krebsonsecurity.com/2015/07/online-cheating-site-ashleymadison-hacked/.
61. Kim Zetter, Ashley Madison Hackers Release an Even Bigger Batch of Data, WIRED
(Aug. 20, 2015, 3:01 PM), http://www.wired.com/2015/08/ashley-madison-hackers-releaseeven-bigger-batch-data/.
62. Krebs, supra note 60.
63. Chris Baraniuk, Ashley Madison: ‘Suicides’ over Website Hack, BBC NEWS (Aug. 24,
2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-34044506.
64. Kim Zetter, Ashley Madison CEO Resigns in Wake of Hack, News of Affairs, WIRED
(Aug. 28, 2015, 11:35 AM), http://www.wired.com/2015/08/ashley-madison-ceo-resigns-wakehack-news-affairs/.
65. Ashley Madison Faces Huge Class-Action Lawsuit, BBC NEWS (Aug. 23, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-34032760.
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However, those exposed have faced several hurdles during the litigation
process. The Missouri federal district judge presiding over the multidistrict litigation ordered the class representatives to be publicly
identified66 and prohibited the plaintiffs from referencing stolen
documents in their consolidated complaint.67 Despite these limitations, in
2017, Ashley Madison reached a settlement deal with consumers totaling
$11.2 million, in addition to the company’s $1.6 million fine from the
FTC.68 Affected consumers can claim up to $2,000 to cover costs of
identity theft.
While each of these data breaches have different facts, the common
element was devastation to both individuals and to the breached entity.
In many instances, the business is left just as exposed as the individuals.
What remains constant is that neither have adequate recourse.
C. Data Breach Victims: Where Are the Remedies?
The overarching theme of these data breaches is the ineffectiveness of
the legal system to redress wrongs in a timely or complete fashion. Both
the hacked businesses and victimized individuals are left frustrated and
wonderingwhere are the remedies? Breaches are akin to thefts of
valuable information or personal property, and yet victims lack a clear
pathway to legal redress. Hackers are most often anonymous or difficult
to hold accountable. Even more frustrating is the inability to stop the
republication of the hacked personal information. After the hacker’s work
is done, the damage is furthered by bloggers, the media, and others, who
copy, republish, and comment on the stolen data.69 In fact, hackers
generally view broad publication of the data by the media after the breach
as an integral component of their plan to harm the target of the breach.
Principals of free speech and free press protect the republication of
hacked data, leaving little opportunity for a data subject to seek relief
once stolen data has been made available to the media.70
66. Brandon Lowrey, Ashley Madison Class Reps Can’t Hide Names in Hack MDL,
LAW360 (Apr. 6, 2016, 10:52 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/781507/ashley-madisonclass-reps-can-t-hide-names-in-hack-mdl.
67. Steven Trader, Ashley Madison Users Blocked from Citing Leaked Docs, LAW360 (May
2, 2016, 3:26 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/791195/ashley-madison-users-blockedfrom-citing-leaked-docs.
68. David Kravets, Lawyers Score Big in Settlement for Ashley Madison Cheating Site Data
Breach, ARS TECHNICA (July 17, 2017, 1:15 PM), https://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2017/07/sssshhh-claim-your-19-from-ashley-madison-class-action-settlement/.
69. The Legality of Publishing Hacked E-mails, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV.,
http://www.cjr.org/the_observatory/the_legality_of_publishing_hac.php (last visited Jan. 19,
2017).
70. WikiLeaks published data that revealed a person’s sexual status, and also identified
underage victims of sexual assault. This sensitive information was later widely republished by
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Legal remedies for commonplace wrongs such as a home invasion or
physical theft of personal property are by comparison adequate and
predictable. Consider the theft of a laptop versus the theft of information
inside the laptop. If that laptop is found even after it has been sold or
exchanged, the owner gets the tangible laptop back. If the information on
the laptop is opened and disclosed, that personal data may be irretrievable
and damage may continue to be inflicted regardless of a retrieval.
Whether it is a jewel thief or a data thief, the law should have a defined
toolbox to protect societal values and ownership interests. The broad
categories of legal remedies include criminal penalties, civil damages, or
injunctions to prevent harm. Yet despite multiple legal approaches
available, remedies for data breach victims are not reliably effective. For
both individuals and corporations, the remedies for data breaches seem
both limited and limitless.
II. EVALUATING A BREACH
The first steps in evaluating the post-breach legal remedies and
options are evaluations of A) who is responsible for the unauthorized
disclosure, and B) how did the breach occur. The answers to these
deceptively simple questions dictate the immediate response and define
options for moving forward.
A. Who Is the Intruder?
Not all online intruders hide behind their computer screens. Some
publicly celebrate their breach. There are four basic categories of
potential intruders: the whistleblower, the insider, the hacker, and the
republisher.
1. The Whistleblower
A whistleblower obtains and discloses data to expose some degree of
misconduct.71 Under the Whistleblower Protection Act, federal
employees are generally protected if they reasonably believed that the
disclosure would reveal “any violation of any law, rule, or regulation”72
or “gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority,
or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.”73 There
third parties. Raphael Satter & Maggie Michael, Private Lives Are Exposed as WikiLeaks Spills
Its Secrets, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 23, 2016, 5:09 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/
b70da83fd111496dbdf015acbb7987fb/private-lives-are-exposed-wikileaks-spills-its-secrets.
71. What
Is
a
Whistleblower?,
GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY
PROJECT,
https://www.whistleblower.org/whatwhistleblower (last visited Jan. 19, 2017).
72. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A)(i) (2012).
73. Id. § 2302(b)(8)(A)(ii).
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are additional restrictions on what types of information can be disclosed
to the press or public.74 Daniel Ellsberg and Edward Snowden are both
lauded as whistleblowers.75 Congress has further extended protection to
corporate whistleblowers who reasonably believe that their disclosure
reveals corporate fraud or other violations of federal or state financial
regulations.76
2. The Insider
“Insider” data breaches can be committed by a well-intentioned
whistleblower or by an employee who uses internal data with the intent
to harm the company or for any other unauthorized purpose. One example
is a Walgreen pharmacist’s disclosure of prescription records to her
husband with the motivation to harm a woman she suspected had shared
a sexually transmitted disease with her husband.77 The result was a $1.4
million verdict against Walgreens for negligent supervision.78 Insider
breaches can be inadvertent or negligent. In fact, internal actors were
responsible for 25% of breaches in 2016, and 14% of all 2016 breaches
were due to employee error.79 The image of the highly trained hacker or
hackers sitting in a dimly lit room with multiple screens is not always
accurate. Often the breach is simply caused by an angry employee or a
negligent subcontractor, however, sometimes it can be an act of a
malicious and sophisticated hacker.
3. The Hacker
There are a wide variety of techniques to hack databases—some
technical and some based on human frailty. Intrusions committed by
74. Id. § 2302(b)(8)(A)-(B); see generally Nick Schwellenbach, Survivor’s Guide to Being
a Successful Whistleblower in the Federal Government, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 22, 2017),
https://www.justsecurity.org/37994/survivors-guide-successful-whistleblower-federalgovernment/.
75. Ellsberg and Snowden’s background and acts are often pitted against one another. See,
e.g., Malcolm Gladwell, Daniel Ellsberg, Edward Snowden, and the Modern Whistle-Blower,
NEW YORKER (Dec. 19, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/12/19/danielellsberg-edward-snowden-and-the-modern-whistle-blower.
76. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (to be codified in various sections of the U.S. Code); Sarbanes Oxley Act
of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 15,
28, and 29 U.S.C.).
77. Andrew Scurria, Walgreen Pharmacy Customer Scores $1.4M Privacy Verdict,
LAW360 (July 29, 2013, 7:08 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/460788/walgreen-pharmacycustomer-scores-1-4m-privacy-verdict.
78. Id.
79. See VERIZON, 2017 DATA BREACH INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 2 (2017),
https://www.knowbe4.com/hubfs/rp_DBIR_2017_Report_execsummary_en_xg.pdf.
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criminal hackers include point-of-sale hacks, web-app attacks, physical
theft, crimeware, spear phishing, brute-force attacks on encryption, card
skimmers, and cyber espionage.80 The tools of this trade may include
exhaustive preparation and extensive knowledge of the dark web. There
are also hackers that focus on human frailty. The story of the hacker that
gains access because an employee downloaded malware that the hacker
baited the employee into downloading is well known.81 The criminal
hacker makes victims out of unsuspecting consumers and the company
as well. Criminal hacks comprised the majority (62%) of data disclosures
in 2016.82 This criminal hacker is unambiguously motivated to harm a
target, expose a truth, benefit herself personally, or in the case of
corporate espionage, benefit or harm a competitor.83
4. The Republisher
A republisher is a type of intruder that is often overlooked despite their
ability to inflict substantial damage with one simple post. A republisher
is an entity, such as a curious individual on social media, a blog, or a
major media outlet, that publicly shares leaked data after a breach.84
Hackers may count on republishers to disseminate stolen data once
leaked, or may even provide information directly to media outlets with
the expectation that the media will publish the data. By reaching a broad
audience, a republisher may cause as muchor moredamage than the
hacker who initially stole the information.85 There is little legal authority
80. VERIZON, 2014 DATA BREACH INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 16, 20, 27, 32, 35, 43 (2014),
http://www.verizonenterprise.com/resources/reports/rp_Verizon-DBIR-2014_en_xg.pdf.
81. Peter Schablik & Scott M. Higgins, The People Factor in Cyber Breach, FAST
COMPANY (Oct. 14, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.fastcompany.com/3064490/growth-notes/thepeople-factor-in-cyber-breach.
82. See VERIZON, supra note 79, at 2.
83. Not all hackers are nefariously motivated. Security researchers, often labeled as white
hat hackers, will intrude systems to expose vulnerabilities. Unfortunately, the line between
“criminal hackers” and “white hat hackers” is ambiguous, which puts white hat hackers at risk of
criminal culpability. For example, in August 2017, the FBI arrested Marcus Hutchins on suspicion
that the security researcher developed and/or sold the malware strain Kronos. Hutchins is known
for stopping the spread of the WannaCry ransomware and is seen as a white hat hacker by most
in the security community. See, e.g., Brian Krebs, Who Is Marcus Hutchins, KREBS ON SECURITY
(Sept. 5, 2017, 6:50 AM), https://krebsonsecurity.com/2017/09/who-is-marcus-hutchins/.
84. Jon Mills et al., Ashley Madison—Intrusion and the Family, UF L. FAC. BLOGS,
https://facultyblogs.law.ufl.edu/ashleymadisonintrusionandthefamily/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2017).
85. While “revenge porn” is commonly not treated as a data breach, the republication of
nonconsensual intimate media is a frustrating example of the horrendous amount of damage that
can occur after an initial data intrusion. See generally Mary Anne Franks, “Revenge Porn”
Reform: A View from the Front Lines, 69 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming Sept. 2017) (detailing the
harms of revenge porn and discussing the trend of states criminalizing the unauthorized disclosure
of sexually explicit images of adults). For example, in 2014, Ryan Collins used phishing

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2017

17

Florida Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 3

788

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

to prevent or punish the third-party publicationparticularly in the
United States. The legal issue becomes balancing intrusion against free
speech principles.86 Often, the republisher who copies and redistributes
the hacked information may be protected by free speech principles.
Relevant factors that may determine the outcome of legal challenges to
republishers include: How was the information obtained? Did the
republisher have a role in hacking or stealing the information, or were
they an innocent third party? Is the disclosure of the content illegal,
overly intrusive, or without justification? Was the subject of the
publication newsworthy? Generally, content of the disclosure may not be
considered, except in some limited constitutionally accepted restraints on
speech relating to national security,87 obscenity, defamation, fraud,
incitement, and speech integral to criminal conduct.88 However, these
cases are few and far between. Usually courts have allowed publication
of dangerous, intrusive, and even illegally obtained information by third
parties. 89
B. How Did the Intrusion Occur?
The method of intrusion is also relevant to the legal analysis and legal
liability. Data stolen despite an advanced security system differs
significantly from data stolen because of a weak security system. In the
wake of the Target hack, there were several reports regarding the
company’s flawed security standards.90 Failure to meet technical or any
techniques to hack into the iCloud and Google accounts of several celebrities and then
disseminated private, mostly nude images and videos of the celebrities. After several weeks of the
media being shared privately, the photos and videos were posted on several online forums—
including 4chan and Reddit. In the span of one day, a subreddit titled “the Fappening” amassed
over 100,000 subscribers. The willingness of both individuals and websites to non-consensually
republish the intimate media prolonged the celebrities’ victimization and amount of harm
suffered. See generally Adrienne Massanari, #GamerGate and The Fappening: How Reddit’s
Algorithm, Governance, and Culture Support Toxic Technocultures, 19 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 329
(2015); Lancaster County Man Sentenced to 18 Months in Federal Prison for Hacking Apple and
Google E-Mail Accounts Belonging to More than 100 People, Including Many Celebrities, U.S.
ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, MIDDLE DIST. OF PA., DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Oct. 27, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-mdpa/pr/lancaster-county-man-sentenced-18-months-federalprison-hacking-apple-and-google-e-mail.
86. See, e.g.,. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001); Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S.
524 (1989).
87. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
88. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468–69 (2010).
89. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (holding the government
could not use the national security exception to enjoin newspapers from publishing government
documents).
90. Jaikumar Vijayan, Target Breach Happened Because of a Basic Network Segmentation
Error, COMPUTERWORLD (Feb. 6, 2014, 6:28 AM), http://www.computerworld.com/article/
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other reasonable security measures can spell liability. The class action
lawsuit filed against Target specifically complained of rampant disregard
of industry standard violations and negligence after the company ignored
reports of the vulnerabilities of their point of sale system.91 Target’s
negligent adherence to ineffective security protocols potentially exposed
it to more liability than if the company had simply followed industry
standards and heeded expert advice.92 The subsequent FTC v. Wyndham
Worldwide Corp.93 decision reinforces the fact that negligence in
maintaining cyber security incurs legal liability.94 In addition to
penalizing Wyndham, that case confirmed the FTC’s right to hold
companies to a standard of care for customer data.95
However, some intrusions are seemingly unavoidable. A company
could abide by all security standards and still be hacked by a sophisticated
group of cyber-criminals. This gap between cyber defense regulations
and sophisticated attacks is largely due to the rapid development of
technology. Abiding by regulations and standards created ten, five, or
even two years ago does not necessarily prepare a company for the
evolution of a modern cyber-criminal attack.96 Experts now advise
companies to accept that that data breaches are virtually inevitable and
focus on how to respond, as well as how to secure their most valuable
data through encryption, controlling access, and authorization.97
This is especially true as these attacks become even more
unpredictable. Cybercriminals have begun deploying ransomware attacks
on soft targets, such as hospitals and law firms. After hacking into the
system by exploiting software vulnerabilities, the criminals gain access
2487425/cybercrime-hacking/target-breach-happened-because-of-a-basic-network-segmentation
-error.html; see also Michael Riley et al., Missed Alarms and 40 Million Stolen Credit Card
Numbers: How Target Blew It, BLOOMBERG: BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 17, 2014, 10:31 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-03-13/target-missed-alarms-in-epic-hack-of-credit
-card-data.
91. Class Action Complaint at 12–13, Trustmark Nat. Bank v. Target Co., No.
1:14CV02069, 2014 WL 1229602 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 2014).
92. Joel Schectman, Banks Heap Suits on Target over Breach, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 7, 2014,
3:06 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2014/02/07/banks-heap-suits-on-target-overdata-breach/.
93. 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015).
94. Id. at 246; see infra pp. 796–97.
95. Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 246.
96. See Joe Dysart, ‘Ransomware’ Software Attacks Stymie Law Firms, A.B.A (June 1,
2015, 2:30 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/ransomware_software_attacks_
stymie_law_firms; Kim Zetter, Why Hospitals Are the Perfect Targets for Ransomware, WIRED
(Mar. 30, 2016, 1:31 PM), https://www.wired.com/2016/03/ransomware-why-hospitals-are-theperfect-targets/.
97. See GEMALTO & SAFENET, 2014 YEAR OF MEGA BREACHES & IDENTITY THEFT 11
(2014), http://breachlevelindex.com/pdf/Breach-Level-Index-Annual-Report-2014.pdf.
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to PII and other confidential information and then threaten to expose the
information if the ransom is not paid. For example, the 2017 WannaCry
and Petya attacks used leaked NSA exploits to cripple networks across
the globe. Notably, the Petya attack successfully targeted DLA Piper, an
international law firm that touted its cybersecurity prowess.98 In addition
to reputational harm, the attack left the firm without phone and internal
document access for at least one day and without email access for nearly
a week.99
As discussed, data breaches do not end with the intrusion, and often
republication by third parties cause the most harm.100 Though the First
Amendment protects most republishers, in Bartnicki v. Vopper101 the U.S.
Supreme Court set forth a three-part balancing test that weighs the
conduct of the defendant, the public importance of the disclosure, and the
nature of the disclosure.102 This balancing test determines the chance of
success in limiting the dissemination and has become the essential rubric
for determining the legality of such disclosures.103
Therefore, the Bartnicki analysis is important in examining
publication of data breaches. In Bartnicki, the Court found that
broadcasting a stolen audio recording was protected by the First
Amendment because of the public importance of the recording, and
because the defendant himself did not conduct the initial breach even
though he knew it was obtained illegally.104 However, the Court indicated
it would consider punishing disclosure if the disclosing party engaged in
illegal activity to obtain the information.105
The logic of Bartnicki supports balancing privacy and publicly
important information, sometimes with opposing outcomes. In
Dahlstrom v. Sun Times Media, LLC,106 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit used the Bartnicki three-part test to determine that
publication of illegally obtained information was wrongful.107 The court
98. See Sam Reisman, Days After Hack, DLA Piper Restores Email Service, LAW360 (June
30, 2017 6:35 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/940448/days-after-hack-dla-piper-restoresemail-service.
99. Id.
100. See supra Section I.C.
101. 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
102. See id. at 525, 527, 534.
103. See Eric B. Easton, Ten Years After: Bartnicki v. Vopper as a Laboratory for First
Amendment Advocacy and Analysis, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 287, 330 (2011).
104. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 529–30, 533–34.
105. The Court, citing to New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982), identifies the
dissemination of child pornography as an example of a “rare occasion[] in which a law
suppressing one party’s speech may be justified by an interest in deterring criminal conduct by
another.” Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 528–30.
106. 777 F.3d 937 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 689 (2015).
107. Id. at 953.
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reasoned that publisher misconduct, combined with the determination
that the information was not of great public interest, meant that disclosure
was not protected by the First Amendment.108 The court also recognized
that the statute in question, the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA),
limited disclosure of data based on the categorization and the source of
the data.109 Importantly, because the statutory limitation was not based
on content, the review of the statute’s constitutionality did not face strict
scrutiny.110 The particular data in question were records of police officers
that disclosed personal information from DPPA records.111 The issue is
therefore a hybrid because the restriction is based on both the source
(DPPA) and content (personal information), which the Sun-Times argued
amounted to prior restraint.
The protective order issued by the lower court was also more
justifiable because the same information about the officers derived from
other sources was permitted to be published, thus reducing the public
interest factor of the illegally obtained information.112 This evaluation is
very fact-specific, as are many cases in the privacy-disclosure area.113
However, this case provides further logic supporting a restriction on
disclosure of information that was legally obtained and personal in
nature. This same logic may be used to support restrictions on disclosures
or publications of sensitive information obtained from a breach. In other
words, only a statute restricting disclosure of certain types of sensitive
personal information obtained from an unlawful data breach could be
constitutional.
Under the Bartnicki analysis, if a republisher has no knowledge that
the data she seeks to publish was obtained illegally, the right of
republication will almost always prevail.114 This means that bloggers who
“innocently” posts stolen material may be protected under the Bartnicki
standard. Likewise, the Bartnicki standard would protect whistleblowers
who reveal publicly valuable information such as government or
corporate misconduct, while those who reveal private matters unrelated
to public affairs are afforded little protection under the Whistleblower
Protection Act. Announced in 2001, the Bartnicki standard predates many
of the technical intrusions society now expects.115 However, the ability to
balance the impact of intrusion against the nature of the disclosure is still
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 954.
See id. at 946–49.
Id. at 949.
Id. at 941.
Id. at 953–54.
Id. at 954
See Easton, supra note 103, at 333.
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 514 (2001).
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relevant.116 The Bartnicki standard can provide a bridge to a remedy
against harmful republication of leaked or hacked data, particularly in
cases where the breach does not contain information of public concern,
or where the data was obtained illegally.
III. THE LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND STANDARDS FOR DATA SECURITY
Any entity in possession of personally-identifiable data has certain
duties to protect that data. These standards of care are continually
evolving based on rapid developments in technology and shifting legal
and regulatory standards. If a data breach does occur, there are some
firmly established obligations for companies to abide by, but there are
many unknown risks. The type of data and position of the data subject
determine many of these regulations. One thing is certain—the breached
entity must be ready to take immediate responsive action to the breach,
or else be exposed to multiple dangers, including legal liability.117 This
Section will explore various federal, state, and international data
protection laws, as well as provide examples that show how companies
have responded to modern data breaches.
A. Federal Trade Commission—The Common Law of Privacy
The principal federal watchdog on privacy issues is now the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC). The FTC has a statutory duty to protect
consumers, and this federal agency has interpreted this role to allow it to
promulgate rules on data collection and protection as well as to punish
violators of its standards.118 Accordingly, the FTC is now the source of
116. Consider the 2016 breaches involving the Democratic National Convention and the
NSA. While the exact sources of these two breaches remains unknown, both breaches resulted
from hacking and included the publication of highly intrusive information—including donor PII
from the DNC breach and the NSA’s own hacking tools from the NSA breach. News agencies
will have to continue to determine the best way to report on these kinds of breaches, which will
have to include decisions regarding how much actual content from the breach to publish. See
generally Dan Goodin, Group Claims to Hack NSA-Tied Hackers, Posts Exploits as Proof, ARS
TECHNICA (Aug. 15, 2016, 8:50 PM), http://arstechnica.com/security/2016/08/group-claims-tohack-nsa-tied-hackers-posts-exploits-as-proof/ (describing the effects of an anonymous group’s
hack without detailing the specific information the group made public); Dan Spinelli et al.,
Identity Thieves Target Dems’ Big Donors After DNC Hack, POLITICO (Aug. 18, 2016, 5:03 AM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2016/08/democratic-donors-identity-theft-cyberhack-227140
(detailing the extent of anonymous hacks of donor information without revealing what specific
information was made public).
117. Generally, all breached entities must be immediately prepared to respond to potential
lawsuits from their consumers, financial institutions, insurers, shareholders, employees, and the
government. See Melissa Maleske, The 6 Lawsuits All GCs Face After a Data Breach, LAW360
(Dec. 9, 2015. 2:17 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/735838/the-6-lawsuits-all-gcs-faceafter-a-data-breach.
118. FED. TRADE COMM’N, A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION’S
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most rules and standards for data collection and security.119 The FTC’s
seemingly simple authority under Section V of the Federal Trade
Commission Act to prevent “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce”120 has spawned an entire network of privacy and
cybersecurity law as interpreted by the FTC.121 Despite a relatively small
number of professional staff, the FTC has become the most prominent
federal agency in privacy policy. The FTC has regulatory authority to
protect consumer privacy through the Fair Credit Reporting Act122 and
the Gramm–Leach Bliley Act.123 Additionally, the FTC regulates data
management practices of websites targeted towards children as set forth
in the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act.124
The FTC drafts enforcement actions and publications that establish
industry standards for privacy and security. A company that breaks these
standards is immediately put within the crosshairs of Section 5,125 which
grants authority to the FTC to file an action against organizations that
engage in “unfair or deceptive . . . practices.”126 The FTC investigates
and cites hundreds of companies for violations of regulatory standards.
In addition, the FTC will punish companies that fail to comply with their
own privacy policies—even if their actions square with FTC standards.127
That sanction is imposed because misrepresentations of privacy or
security policies is a violation of fairness standards even when the
policies comply with technical standards. Data security violations can
include: allowing data to be exposed by inadequate encryption or flawed
security software, failure to test a security system, failure to implement
INVESTIGATIVE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY 2 (2008), https://www.ftc.gov/aboutftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority.
119. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012).
120. Id. § 45(a)(1).
121. See generally CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW AND
POLICY ch. 6–11 (2016) (surveying the FTC’s authorities on specific issues such as online privacy,
information security and international privacy efforts).
122. Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1127 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1681
(2012)).
123. Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–
09); see FED. TRADE COMM’N, IN BRIEF: THE FINANCIAL PRIVACY REQUIREMENTS OF THE GRAMMLEACH-BLILEY ACT 1, 4 (2002), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plainlanguage/bus53-brief-financial-privacy-requirements-gramm-leach-bliley-act.pdf.
124. Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–
06); see HOOFNAGLE, supra note 121, at 198–99.
125. ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 719–20 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45).
126. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).
127. See, e.g., Google Will Pay $22.5 Million to Settle FTC Charges It Misrepresented
Privacy Assurances to Users of Apple’s Safari Internet Browser, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Aug.
9, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/08/google-will-pay-225-millionsettle-ftc-charges-it-misrepresented.
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security procedures, failure to assess procedures, failure to implement
industry standards, failure to minimize data collection, failure to train
employees, failure to monitor recipients, such as contractors or third
parties, and inadequate password protocols.128
Dependent on the rapid development of technology, the manner in
which companies collect and use data is unpredictable. Accordingly, in
an effort to uphold their mission to protect consumers, the FTC has built
their regulatory regime upon the principle of adaptability. FTC
enforcement actions are not always spurred by actual breaches. The FTC
can also find violations of their suggested practices (as provided in Start
with Security: A Guide for Business), such as inadequate mode of
collection, storage, usage of data, or failure to notify consumers about
these inadequacies.129 These suggested practices are further reinforced
through the FTC’s blog series, Stick with Security: Insights into FTC
Investigations.130 The FTC may also punish a company that violates its
own terms of service under the deceptive practices theory, even if the data
management practice would otherwise be considered adequate.131 Some
industry representatives have commented that companies may be better
situated by not making any representations about privacy other than those
absolutely required.132
These punishments are initiated by FTC staff and are either a product
of their own investigations or a result of consumer complaints. These
actions usually end in settlements—213 occurred as of August 2017133—
although some violations have occasionally gone to trial.134 Settlements
are usually in the form of a consent decree, and the company agrees to
stop the disputed act. If a consent decree is violated, the FTC may fine
the corporate data custodian up to $60,654 for each violation.135 The fine
can reach exceedingly high amounts if a company violates a consent
128. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, START WITH SECURITY: A GUIDE FOR BUSINESS 3–8, 10, 12–
14 (2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/pdf0205-startwith
security.pdf.
129. Id.
130. Stick with Security: Insights into FTC Investigations, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (JULY
21, 2017, 10:57 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2017/07/sticksecurity-insights-ftc-investigations.
131. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 128.
132. Id.
133. FED. TRADE COMM’N, LEGAL RESOURCES 1 (2017), https://www.ftc.gov/tipsadvice/business-center/legal-resources?title=&type=case&field_consumer_protection_topics_
tid=245&field_industry_tid=All&field_date_value%5Bmin%5D%5Bdate%5D=&field_date_va
lue%5Bmax%5D%5Bdate%5D=August+24%2C+2017&sort_by=field_date_value.
134. See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 2015).
135. FTC Publishes Inflation-Adjusted Civil Penalty Amounts, FED. TRADE COMMISSION,
(Jan. 12, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/01/ftc-publishes-inflationadjusted-civil-penalty-amounts.
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decree or court order through the continued failure to protect consumer
data. For example, the FTC levied a $100 million fine against LifeLock
Inc. after the FTC determined that the company violated a 2010 federal
court order requiring the company to secure consumers’ personal
information and prohibiting deceptive advertising.136
As a federal agency, the composition and focus of the FTC is often
subject to political changes, including federal elections. Commissioners
serve seven-year terms, and if there is a vacancy, the President of the
United States nominates an individual to fill the position and the nominee
must then be confirmed by the United States Senate.137 While no more
than three of the five Commissioners can be of the same political party,
the President selects one Commissioner to act as Chairman.138
Predictably, the Chairman’s focus can significantly alter the FTC’s
direction. For example, the appointment of Maureen Ohlhausen as
Chairwoman by President Trump in January 2017 is expected to cause
the Commission to reprioritize the proof of tangible harm during FTC
investigations, which ultimately may cause a reprioritization of corporate
data security responsibilities.139
Despite this malleability, the effects of the FTC’s standards are farreaching. There is no private cause of action under Section 5 for
consumers, but the FTC orders create data management standards that
directly benefit consumers and affect standards for liability.140 Many
states have adopted unfair and deceptive trade practices laws modeled
after Section 5, and common law negligence causes of actions have
developed based off of these state statutes.141 By setting these standards,
the FTC draws the line between effective data protection and violations
of fair consumer practices. A breach that occurs because the company
fails to comply with the FTC’s standards exposes a company to liability
for consequences of the breach. Two recent orders against Wyndham
Hotel Corporation and LabMD, Inc. illustrate and confirm the FTC’s
regulatory reach for protecting consumer privacy.

136. See LifeLock to Pay $100 Million to Consumers to Settle FTC Charges It Violated 2010
Order, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Dec. 17, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2015/12/lifelock-pay-100-million-consumers-settle-ftc-charges-it-violated.
137. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, COMMISSIONERS, CHAIRWOMEN AND CHAIRMEN OF THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (Dec. 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/
commissioners/ftc_commissioners_history_-_december_2016.pdf.
138. Id.
139. See Allison Grande, New FTC Chair to Shift Data Security Focus to Actual Harm, LAW
360 (Jan. 26, 2017, 9:28 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/885212/new-ftc-chair-to-shiftdata-security-focus-to-actual-harm.
140. See infra note 147 and accompanying text.
141. See FLA. STAT. § 501.204(1) (2016).
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1. FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in FTC v. Wyndham
Worldwide Corp.142 reinforced the FTC’s central role in data security.
After a data breach, the Wyndham Worldwide Corporation argued that
the FTC did not have the statutory authority to penalize it for security
failures and that it did not have constitutional notice of potential liability.
In other words, since the FTC had no explicit statutory authority to set
security standards, Wyndham could not have fair notice of FTC
standards. This challenge went to the core of the FTC’s authority to
regulate privacy. Yet, the court rejected those arguments, concluding that
the FTC had authority to regulate data security practices under the
unfairness prong of the FTC Act, the company’s practices did not fall
outside the plain meaning of unfair, and that previous FTC adjudications
and interpretive guidance provided the company with fair notice.143
In addition to misstating their own privacy policy in an unfair way,
Wyndham’s substantial list of security transgressions included allowing
payment card information to be available in readable text and failing to
monitor for malware.144 The Third Circuit agreed with the FTC that
Wyndham had engaged in cybersecurity practices that “taken together,
unreasonably and unnecessarily exposed consumers’ personal data to
unauthorized access and theft.”145 More notably, the court agreed that the
FTC—as the focal point of cybersecurity policy to protect consumers—
has the authority to interpret statutes, including 15 U.S.C. 45(a).146 This
opinion marked a major victory for FTC authority. Consequently,
corporations like Wyndham are put on notice of cybersecurity standards
from FTC consent orders as well as other administrative guidance.147 In
the wake of this decision, corporations must regularly assess their own
security practices, track security rulings and law changes, and be aware
that an FTC violation could subject the company to future negligence
charges. For example, if a company does not encrypt sensitive
information stored on its computer network,148 this failure could
constitute a breach of an applicable security standard in a negligence
action. In sum, then-FTC chairperson Edith Ramirez identified the
Wyndham case as one of importance for the future of data security:

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015).
Id. at 244–55.
Id. at 258.
Id. at 240.
Id. at 253–55, 259.
Id. at 257.
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 128, at 6.
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“[T]he court rulings in the case have affirmed the vital role the FTC plays
in this important area.”149
2. LabMD, Inc.
Another example of the FTC’s moves for privacy preeminence
involves a three-year investigation of the clinical laboratory, LabMD. In
2012, the billing information for over 9,000 LabMD consumers was
found on a peer-to-peer file sharing network, which led to the direct
exposure of several hundred consumers’ records to identity thieves.150 On
July 29, 2016, the FTC issued a Final Order that reversed an
administrative law judge’s dismissal of the FTC’s enforcement action
with the main point of contention being whether an actual injury
occurred.151 In the reversal, the FTC specifically reasoned that the federal
commission did not have to abide by federal standing requirements, thus
promulgating that a cognizable injury is not required for an FTC action.152
Further, the FTC justified their continued action against the now-defunct
LabMD because the company technically still maintained consumer
information and may use this information in the future.153 The issues of
whether there is a tangible injury is a major threshold for federal
jurisdiction. The issue is critical because negligent security practices may
not result in actual injury. For example, the FTC may discover bad
practices before there is a breach. If this decision survives appeal, then
not only will consumer harm be redefined in injury requirements, but
breached companies will be forced to deal with an FTC that can enforce
its standards without needing to demonstrate harm.
B. Federal Communications Commission—Common
Carrier Regulation
As with the FTC, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
has steadily expanded its regulatory reach. Although, the 2017 shift of
leadership has already diverted this growth. The FCC regulates
telecommunication companies, cable and satellite television providers,

149. Wyndham Settles FTC Charges It Unfairly Placed Consumers’ Payment Card
Information at Risk, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Dec. 9, 2015, 12:00 PM),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/12/wyndham-settles-ftc-charges-itunfairly-placed-consumers-payment.
150. LabMD, Inc., in the Matter of, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/
enforcement/cases-proceedings/102-3099/labmd-inc-matter (last updated Sept. 29, 2016).
151. Final Order at 1, LabMD, Inc., No. 9357 (F.T.C. July 29, 2016).
152. Opinion of the Commission at 20 n.63, LabMD Inc., No. 9357 (F.T.C. July 29, 2016).
153. Id. at 36.
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and, now, internet service providers (ISPs).154 The federal agency is
empowered primarily by Sections 201(b),155 222,156 and 551157 of the
Communications Act and utilizes the “just and reasonable” language in
its authorizing legislation in similar way to how the FTC leverages its
power with the “unfair and deceptive acts” language in Section 5. Similar
to how health entities have a duty to secure protected health information
(PHI), telecommunication carriers have a specific duty to protect the
unique form of data that they collect about their consumers. This data is
called Customer Proprietary Network Information (CPNI) and includes a
wide range of information including the date of a call or the destination
number of each call.158
In addition to providing guidance as how to best protect CPNI, the
FCC has initiated actions against telecommunication companies to
enforce data management standards. In October 2014, the FCC found two
breached telecommunications companies—TerraCom Inc. and
YourTel—in violation of § 201 and § 222 for the companies’ use of
unsecure internet-based (cloud) storage of customer data.159 While
initially planning to fine the companies $10 million,160 the ultimate fine
totaled only $3.5 million.161 In another example, the FCC levied a civil
penalty of $25 million for AT&T’s failure to take “every reasonable
precaution” to protect customer data after two AT&T employees sold
customer information to a third party and exposed the data of 51,422
AT&T customers.162 Only a few months later, the FCC assessed a
154. See Report and Order on Remand at 3, 10, 14, 17, 22, 82–83, Protecting & Promoting
the Open Internet, GN Docket No. 14-28 (F.C.C. Mar. 12, 2015).
155. 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012) (“All charges, practices, classifications, and regulations for
and in connection with such communication service, shall be just and reasonable.”).
156. Id. § 222 (proscribing a duty on telecommunications carriers to “protect the
confidentiality of proprietary information” of their customers and defining CPNI as “information
that relates to the quantity, technical configuration, type, destination, location, and amount of use
of a telecommunications service subscribed to by any customer of a telecommunications carrier,
and that is made available to the carrier by the customer solely by virtue of the carrier-customer
relationship” and “information contained in the bills pertaining to telephone exchange service or
telephone toll service received by a customer of a carrier”).
157. Id. § 551 (defining notice requirement for cable operators and prohibiting cable
operators from “us[ing] the cable system to collect personally identifiable information concerning
any subscriber without the prior written or electronic consent of the subscriber concerned”).
158. Id. § 222.
159. Press Release, Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, FCC Plans $10 Million Fine for Carriers That
Breached Consumer Privacy (Oct. 24, 2014), http://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-plans-10m-finecarriers-breached-consumer-privacy.
160. Id.
161. Press Release, Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, TerraCom and YourTel to Pay $3.5 Million to
Resolve
Consumer
Privacy
&
Lifeline
Investigations
(July
9,
2015),
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-334286A1.pdf.
162. Order ¶ 1, AT&T Servs., Inc., DA 15-399 (F.C.C. Apr. 8, 2015).
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$595,000 penalty on Cox Communications in the FCC’s first ever
enforcement action on a cable company.163 An FCC investigation into a
third-party hack of Cox’s system revealed that the company failed to
adequately protect CPNI and PII.164 Although the FCC primarily focused
on Cox’s failure to protect customer information, the FCC also chastised
the company’s violation of FCC notification standards.165 While AT&T
and Cox simply failed to notify the FCC of the breaches within the
mandated seven-day period, TerraCom and YourTel only notified the
FCC after a news reporter discovered the breach.166
This reinvigorated level of enforcement became particularly
important when the Ninth Circuit—in an opinion that the court has since
ordered to be reheard—held that common carriers are exempt from FTC
Section V actions.167 As a result of this perceived gap, the FCC began
exploring new ways to exert their authority even beyond the enforcement
actions discussed above.
In 2015, the FCC and FTC signed a Memorandum of Understanding,
which clarified that the FTC can target and fine common carriers for any
of their non-common carrier activities, such as any Fair Credit Reporting
Act violations.168 In 2016, the FCC publicized their Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM) that seeks to increase privacy protections for
customers of broadband and other telecommunications services.169 Two
of the most controversial components of the NPRM included (1) tighter
restrictions for the protection of customer data170 and (2) extensive data
breach notification requirements including mandated adoptions of risk
management procedures and the obligation to notify affected customers
no later than ten days after the breach.171 While the NPRM received
extensive support from digital liberties organizations,172 State Attorneys
163. Order ¶ 4, Cox Commc’ns, Inc., DA 15-1241 (F.C.C. Nov. 5, 2015).
164. Id. ¶ 1.
165. Id. ¶ 2.
166. See Press Release, Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, supra note 161.
167. See FTC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, No. 15-16585, 2016 WL 4501685, at *4 (9th Cir.
Aug. 29, 2016), reh'g en banc granted sub nom., Fed. Trade Commn. v. AT&T Mobility LLC,
864 F.3d 995 (9th Cir. 2017).
168. FCC-FTC, FCC-FTC CONSUMER PROTECTION MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 2
(2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cooperation_agreements/151116ftcfccmou.pdf.
169. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband &
Other Telecomm. Servs., WC Docket No. 16-106 (F.C.C Apr. 1, 2016).
170. Id. ¶¶ 60–66.
171. Id. ¶¶ 174, 234.
172. Letter from Access Humboldt et al. to Tom Wheeler, Chairman, FCC (Sept. 7, 2016),
https://www.aclu.org/letter/coalition-letter-urging-fcc-reject-calls-weaken-broadband-privacyrule.
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General173 and the telecommunications industry174 staunchly opposed the
NPRM as unnecessarily draconian. The negative reaction to the NPRM
led then-FCC Chairman Thomas Wheeler to release an updated version
of the proposed rule. The update included sensitivity distinction to
comport with the existing FTC privacy framework, but very little change
to the data breach requirements.175 While the FCC initially adopted the
broadband privacy rules in October 2016,176 current FCC Chairman Ajit
Pai successfully led the effort to stay the enforcement of the rules in
March 2017.177 To formalize this stay, Congress voted to reverse the
privacy rules and President Trump signed an official repeal of the rules
in April 2017.178
Chairman Pai’s leadership signals the FCC’s likely reduced role in the
establishment and enforcement of privacy and data security regulation.179
Despite this course reversal, it is in the best interest of any company that
falls within the common carrier designation to follow both FCC and FTC
guidelines, which includes staying up to date on any FCC consent decrees
and FTC Section 5 enforcements.180
173. Kurt Orzeck, FCC Should Drop ISP Privacy Plan, 16 State AGs Say, LAW360 (Sept.
19, 2016, 9:00 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/840974/fcc-should-drop-isp-privacy-plan16-state-ags-say.
174. Allison Grande, Internet Group Fights Bid for Uniform FCC Privacy Rules, LAW360
(Sept. 21, 2016, 9:58 PM), http://www.law360.com/corporate/articles/843055/internet-groupfights-bid-for-uniform-fcc-privacy-rules.
175. FED. COMMC’N COMM’N, FACT SHEET: CHAIRMAN WHEELER’S PROPOSAL TO GIVE
BROADBAND CONSUMERS INCREASED CHOICE OVER THEIR PERSONAL INFORMATION 2 (2016),
http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2016/db1006/DOC-341633A1.pdf.
176. FCC Adopts Broadband Consumer Privacy Rules, FED. COMM. COMMISSION (Oct. 27,
2016), https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-adopts-broadband-consumer-privacy-rules.
177. FCC Moves to Ensure Consumers Have Uniform Online Privacy Protection, FED.
COMM. COMMISSION (Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-moves-ensureconsumers-have-uniform-online-privacy-protection.
178. Pub. L. No. 115-22; 131 Stat. 88 (2017).
179. See Cecilia Kang, F.C.C., in Potential Sign of the Future, Halts New Data Security
Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/01/technology/fcc-datasecurity-rules.html?mcubz=0.
180. Companies should also stay up to date with any data security guidance released by the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). In 2017, NIST issued a draft
update to their 2014 Cybersecurity Framework that sets forth a highly detailed and technical
approach for private organizations to better manage cybersecurity risk. NAT’L INST. OF
STANDARDS & TECH., FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY:
DRAFT VERSION 1.1 (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents////draftcybersecurity-framework-v1.1-with-markup1.pdf. In 2011, the SEC issued non-binding guidance
for publicly traded companies that suffer a significant cybertheft or are vulnerable to such an
attack. For example, the SEC encourages these companies to disclose a cybersecurity incident if
it renders an investment in the company risky or if the incident materially affects its products,
services, customer relationships, or competitive conditions. See DIV. OF CORP. FIN. SEC. & EXCH.
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C. Federal Standards in Other Sectors and Requirements for
Notification
In addition to the FTC’s broad jurisdiction and FCC regulation of
communications, private and public-sector enterprises have additional
specific regulatory requirements. Those requirements may be extremely
industry specific—such as healthcare data protections set forth in
HIPAA. However, there are also more general statutory requirements,
such as the breach notification standards that apply across industries,
though even these notification standards may differ181 depending on the
specific industry.182 These statutory duties are codified in several
different statutes and federal rules rather than in one comprehensive law.
Irrespective of the particular federal legal obligation in a sector, any entity
that suffers a breach would be well advised to promptly notify those
exposed.
1. Healthcare Data
Among the various possible private sector breaches, one of the most
sensitive is disclosure of healthcare data. HIPAA sets forth the regulatory
framework to protect health information. In the event of a data breach,
entities in the health sector183 are required to notify affected individuals
by first-class mail or email. The health care provider must also notify the
media if the breach affects more than 500 individuals.184 Further, if a
COMM’N, CF DISCLOSURE GUIDANCE: TOPIC NO. 2, at 2, 4 (2011), https://www.sec.gov/
divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfguidance-topic2.htm. In March 2016, the CFPB initiated their first
data security enforcement action against a payment card company that deceived consumers about
its data security practices. Citing the increased frequency of data breaches, the CFPB criticized
the company’s failure to address known security flaws including poor employee practices. See
Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, CFPB Takes Action Against Dwolla for
Misrepresenting Data Security Practices (Mar. 2, 2016), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/aboutus/newsroom/cfpb-takes-action-against-dwolla-for-misrepresenting-data-security-practices/.
181. A 2010 Congressional Research Service Report provides a comprehensive discussion
of the patchwork of federal data breach notification standards. See GINA STEVENS, CONG. RES.
SERV., RL34120, FEDERAL INFORMATION SECURITY AND DATA BREACH NOTIFICATION LAWS 4
(2010).
182. In 2015, Congress considered several data breach bills that would create a more
standardized data breach response across the sectors. The Center for Democracy and Technology
analyzes four of the more prominent data breach bills in this 2015 report. See generally CTR. FOR
DEMOCRACY & TECH., COMPARISON OF FOUR DATA BREACH BILLS CURRENTLY BEFORE CONGRESS
(114TH SESSION) 1 (2015), https://cdt.org/files/2015/09/2015-09-09-Federal-DBN-BillsComparison-Chart_2.pdf.
183. Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, Pub. L. No. 115, 123 Stat. 226 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
184. 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.400–.414 (2017).
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“business associate” entrusted with patient information is breached, the
associate must notify covered entities without unreasonable delay within
sixty days of the breach.185 These protections are of a particular
importance now as the healthcare industry has come under continual
assault from various hackers including the deployment of ransomware to
blackmail the provider.186
2. Education Data
Though education data has heightened privacy protections, the
education sector does not have breach notification requirements, nor are
they the subject of rigorous regulation by the FTC or FCC. In fact, the
2008 amendment to the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
(FERPA) specifically detailed how:
The [U.S.] Department [of Education] does not have the
authority under FERPA to require that agencies or
institutions issue a direct notice to a parent or student upon
an unauthorized disclosure of education records. FERPA
requires only that the agency or institution record the
disclosure so that a parent or student will become aware of
the disclosure during an inspection of the student’s education
record.187
The amendment advises that student notification may be triggered if
the breach involves a social security number or other information that
would increase the likelihood of identity theft.188 The Department of
Education recommends that an institution should notify the Family Policy
Compliance Office (FPCO) if a breach does occur.189 Regardless of
notification, the FPCO has the authority to conduct its own investigation
of the breach.190 If reintroduced in a future session, the proposed Student
Privacy Protection Act would amend the current standards by requiring
parental notification if a student’s data is accessed.191 As student data is
increasingly stored using cloud computing,192 and education technology

185. Id. § 164.410(b).
186. See discussion infra pp. 788–89.
187. PRIVACY TECH. ASSISTANCE CTR., DATA BREACH RESPONSE CHECKLIST 3 (2012),
http://ptac.ed.gov/sites/default/files/checklist_data_breach_response_092012.pdf.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 9.
190. 34 C.F.R. § 99.64(b) (2017).
191. Student Privacy Protection Act, S. 1341, 114th Cong. (2015).
192. See Family Educational Rights and Privacy, Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 75603, 75612
(Dec. 2, 2011); see generally PRIVACY TECH. ASSISTANCE CTR., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS–
CLOUD COMPUTING 1, 4 (2012), http://ptac.ed.gov/sites/default/files/cloud-computing.pdf.
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platforms become mainstream teaching tools,193 FERPA protection of
education data will need to be further updated to anticipate security
challenges unique to sensitive digital data.
3. Financial Data
In the financial sector, Title V of the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act
(GLBA)194 requires financial institutions to notify individuals as soon as
possible if the institution determines that misuse of PII has occurred or is
reasonably possible. Due to the lack of enforcement mechanisms in the
GLBA, the FTC will intervene to initiate compliance if an institution
violates the data security or privacy standards.195 Beyond notification
standards, the SEC has established a series of cybersecurity “requests”
for corporate boards.196 SEC requests range from establishing a corporate
culture of data security to having procedures in place in case of a data
breach.197 In a similar vein, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
also released its 2015 Cybersecurity Report on Best Practices, which
provides an extensive data security guide for broker-dealers.198
4. Data Managed By Government and Government Contractors
In 2015, hackers compromised the data of 4 million federal employees
in the massive Office of Personnel Management breach.199 In the event
of a breach, the federal government must adhere to standards set by
Office of Management and Budget Memorandum M-07-16.200 For
193. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Department of Education Launches the
Educational Quality Through Innovative Partnerships (EQUIP) Experiment to Provide LowIncome Students with Access to New Models of Education and Training (Oct. 14, 2015),
http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/fact-sheet-department-education-launches-educationalquality-through-innovative-partnerships-equip-experiment-provide-low-income-students-accessnew-models-education-and-training; see also FLA. STAT. § 1004.0961 (2016) (beginning in the
2015–2016 school year, Florida students can earn academic credit for online courses).
194. Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338, 1437 (1999) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 6801–09 (2012)).
195. 16 C.F.R. § 314 (2017).
196. OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
OCIE’S 2015 CYBERSECURITY EXAMINATION INITIATIVE 2 (2015), https://www.sec.gov/ocie/
announcement/ocie-2015-cybersecurity-examination-initiative.pdf.
197. Id.
198. See FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., REPORT ON CYBERSECURITY PRACTICES 1 (2015),
https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/p602363%20Report%20on%20Cybersecurity%20Practi
ces_0.pdf.
199. Spencer Ackerman, US Government Responds to Latest Hack: Give Us More Power
over Data Collection, GUARDIAN (June 5, 2015, 3:06 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2015/jun/05/us-government-opm-hack-data-collection-powers.
200. Memorandum from Deputy Dir. for Mgmt. of the Office of Mgmt. & Budget to the
Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies (May 22, 2007), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
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instance, a federal agency must internally disclose a breach of PII within
one hour of becoming aware of the breach.201 However, external
notification is not as immediate and must be done only without
“unreasonable delay.”202
Another specific set of sector regulations apply to government
contractors who handle Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) and
other federal information. Edward Snowden, for example, gained access
to NSA data as an employee of Booz Allen Hamilton, a private sector
contractor.203 In 2015, the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) issued updated guidelines for federal agencies working with
contractors who handle CUI.204 Because the guidelines do not impose
strict requirements for the contractors to adopt, inconsistencies between
different contractors are likely to develop. In May 2016, the Department
of Defense, General Services Administration, and the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration released a Final Rule to be added
to the Federal Acquisition Regulation regarding the basic safeguarding of
contractor information systems.205 The rule is applied with other federal
requirements, but also maps out the basic cyber security practices to be
adopted by all contractors that “process[], store[], or transmit[] [f]ederal
contract information.”206 These practices include: authenticating or
verifying the identities of users, processes, and devices before allowing
access to an information system; sanitizing or destroying information
system media containing federal personnel contract information before
disposal, release, or reuse; and performing periodic malicious code scans
of the information system and real-time scans of files from external
sources as files are downloaded, opened, or executed.207

whitehouse.gov/files/omb/memoranda/2007/m07-16.pdf.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Julian Borger, Booz Allen Hamilton: Edward Snowden’s US Contracting Firm,
GUARDIAN (June 9, 2013, 5:01 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/boozallen-hamilton-edward-snowden.
204. These guidelines are not in and of themselves legally binding. However, failure to
follow industry standards can be risky. See RON ROSS ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH.,
PROTECTING CONTROLLED UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION IN NONFEDERAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS
AND ORGANIZATIONS 12 (2015), http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.
SP.800-171.pdf.
205. Federal Acquisition Regulation for Basic Safeguarding of Contractor Information
Systems, 81 Fed. Reg. 30,439, 30,439 (May 16, 2016) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. pts. 4, 7, 12,
and 52).
206. Id. at 30,445.
207. Id. at 30,446.
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D. State Standards for Breach Notification
In addition to the complex federal standards, forty-eight states have
enacted data breach notification laws. California was the first state to
enact a law requiring notification to victims of a data breach.208 The
statute requires a data custodian to notify the original creator or “owner”
of the data when data is disseminated to an unauthorized person.209 Most
other states have since adopted similar statutes that require prompt
notification when a data breach occurs and authorize civil penalties when
notification is delayed or not made.210 However, if the data is encrypted,
forty-seven states plus the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and
Virgin Islands exempt the entities from these notification
requirements.211 Despite one in five breaches involving paper records,212
several states require notification if the data breach concerns electronic
records only.213 Some states require notification immediately after a
breach occurs, while others allow the data custodian to assess the
potential risk of harm to the person before determining whether to issue
notification.214 Data custodians face consequences for failing to notify or
for making an untimely notification that vary from a small fine issued by
a state agency to a private right of action for damages.215
The multitude of statutes across the states create a patchwork of
standards and enforcement.216 Thirty-one states, plus Puerto Rico and the
District of Columbia, have enacted legislation that broadens the general
definition of personal information to reflect the changing technical
landscape, including username and passwords, answers to security
208. See FCC-FTC, supra note 168, at 1.
209. GINA STEVENS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42475, DATA SECURITY BREACH
NOTIFICATION LAWS 3 (2012).
210. Id.
211. See BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP, STATE DATA BREACH LAW SUMMARY 24–27 (2017),
https://www.bakerlaw.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Data%20Breach%20documents/Data_Bre
ach_Charts.pdf.
212. Melinda L. McLellan, 2015 BakerHostetler Incident Response Report Shows One in
Five Breaches Involved Paper Records, BAKERHOSTETLER (June 1, 2015),
https://www.dataprivacymonitor.com/data-breaches/2015-bakerhostetler-incident-responsereport-shows-one-in-five-breaches-involved-paper-records/.
213. See Many State Data Breach Laws Don’t Protect Paper Records, BLOOMBERG BNA:
TECH., TELECOM & INTERNET BLOG (Jan. 12, 2009), http://www.bna.com/state-data-breachb12884907245/.
214. STEVENS, supra note 209, at 6.
215. Steptoe & Johnson, LLP has created an excellent catalog of the different types of
penalties different state notification laws authorize. STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP, COMPARISON OF
US STATE AND FEDERAL SECURITY BREACH NOTIFICATION LAWS 3 (2016),
http://www.steptoe.com/assets/htmldocuments/SteptoeDataBreachNotificationChart.pdf.
216. See BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP, supra note 211, at 1.
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questions, or biometric data as PII.217 Alternatively, some states employ
a catch-all definition as exemplified by New York’s statute: “Personal
information means any information concerning a natural person which,
because of name, number, personal mark, or other identifier, can be used
to identify such natural person.”218
Most state statutes do not enable civil action if the personal data was
acquired in encrypted form.219 However, a handful of state statutes
provide that if encrypted data is obtained along with access to the
encryption key, it renders the data as accessible as if it were unencrypted,
and, accordingly, a civil action remedy is available.220
Many states give exclusive power to the attorney general to enforce
data breach notice statutes,221 but some states provide exemptions to this
standard, carving out the power for individuals to pursue civil remedies.
Fourteen, plus the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin
Islands, permit a civil cause of action for data breaches, while Texas and
Tennessee address data breach damages under their respective consumer
protection acts.222 Even where a state provides an avenue for relief,
demonstrating sufficient damages for a claim may be a challenge.223 Most
states impose time limits and restrictions on monetary damages, such as
the District of Columbia statute, which expressly states that damages may
not include dignitary damages such as pain and suffering.224
Emerging state standards may soon become industry standards and
targets for other federal and state governments alike. For example, in the
financial services industry, the New York Department of Financial
Services (DFS) is setting a high bar with its highly detailed cybersecurity
regime, which partially went into effect on March 1, 2017.225 This
regulation requires covered entities to implement an internal
cybersecurity program and policy, requires third-party service providers
to have a cybersecurity policy, hire a chief information security officer,
217. Id. at 2–9.
218. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa(1)(a) (McKinney 2016).
219. For example, Arkansas’s statute notes how the statute only applies to “unencrypted data
elements.” BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP, supra note 211, at 24.
220. See id. at 24–27.
221. State Attorneys General (AGs) are further expanding the role in data breaches by using
these notification laws to step in when the FTC fails to take action. For example, the New York
AG entered into a settlement with Uber mandating the adoption of new authentication and
encryption practices. Allison Grande, Uber Privacy Pact Shows New Enforcement Role for State
AGs, LAW360 (Jan. 11, 2016, 10:47 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/745180/uber-privacypact-shows-new-enforcement-role-for-state-ags.
222. See BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP, supra note 211, at 22–23.
223. See generally Elizabeth D. de Armond, A Dearth of Remedies, 113 PA. ST. L. REV. 1,
7–8 (2008) (discussing federal gaps and the states’ role in protecting data privacy).
224. See BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP, supra note 211, at 23.
225. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 500 (2017).
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comply with access privileges and personnel/intelligence requirements,
adopt an incident response plan, and bear the responsibility to provide
notice of qualifying security to the DFS superintendent.226 The existence
of state requirements and standards presents a challenge to every
multistate enterprise. For example, the litigation surrounding the Target
breach included allegations of violations of certain state standards where
civil actions were authorized, as well as federal standards. Interstate
enterprises are well advised to be aware of state security and notification
standards.
IV. PRIVATE CAUSES OF ACTION OR RESPONSES TO A DATA BREACH
Providing legal remedies for victims of breach presents novel
challenges. Government actions are limited to penalizing companies or
punishing hackers. Government sanctions against companies can be
significant and harmful to these private entities, but harmed individuals
have had limited success because of outdated or inadequate remedies.
Based on the continued frequency of data breaches, government actions
alone are neither an effective deterrent to hackers, nor an adequate
remedy for harmed individuals.
For any given data breach, there may be multiple plaintiffs and also
numerous defendants. The breached entity may seek recovery from others
who are responsible for the data breach. For example, the harmed
company may seek relief against the hacker, an individual causing the
breach, a data custodian, a service provider, or a subcontractor. Other
injured parties—other than the exposed individual—may seek recovery
against the breached company. Common examples are banks or credit
card companies who are legally accountable to customers whose credit
card data was stolen and used.227 Most often, the individual must join a
class action option, which reflects the relatively small nature of the losses,
but also presents multiple approaches to seeking compensation. Even
though the common law remedies have yet to be highly effective, there
are, hypothetically, a plethora of options available.
A. Negligence
A plaintiff in a data breach class action premised on negligence will
allege that the company, as the data custodian, had a duty to exercise
reasonable care in protecting the plaintiff’s PII, the company breached
226. Id.
227. Banks and credit card companies will compensate customers for fraudulent charges, but
seek reimbursement—with varying degrees of success—from retail companies for expenses
incurred through a data breach. Julie Creswell, As Online Data Theft Escalates, Banks Look to
Retailers to Bear the Losses, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/
09/29/business/as-online-data-theft-escalates-banks-look-to-retailers-to-bear-the-losses.html.
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that same duty, and that this breach caused the resulting damages, for
example, allowing or inducing the data breach.228 Typical claims brought
against a data custodian premised on negligence may be negligent or
unreasonable data security practices, failing to fix compromised security
systems, failing to test a network security system, or breaching a general
duty to keep consumer’s data safe.229 In these negligence actions, the
standard of care is a central issue during litigation.230
These actions may allege that the data custodian “enables cybercrime,
unreasonable data security practices, or fail[s] to fix known security
vulnerabilities that compromise confidential information.”231 Another
approach to establish liability is grounded in statutory standards for data
custodians, “such as vendor liability under Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC) or the application of professional malpractice
law to software programmers.”232 Still other plaintiffs have pled liability
on grounds of a breach of fiduciary duty, alleging that the plaintiff relied
on the company holding the data, which was in a position of trust and
confidence to use the data to the plaintiff’s benefit.233
Regardless of the particular negligence theory a data breach victim
utilizes in a suit against the data custodian, the greatest hurdle data breach
victims face when suing in negligence is the economic loss rule.234 This
time-honored legal doctrine precludes recovery in tort for economic
losses where the economic loss does not stem from a causally related
personal injury or tangible property damage.235 However outdated, courts
228. See Ruiz v. Gap, Inc., 380 F. App’x 689, 691 (9th Cir. 2010).
229. See In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Breach Litig., 996 F. Supp. 2d 942,
966 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (explaining that plaintiffs in a data breach class action alleged that Sony
violated a duty to consumers to provide reasonable network security and “allege[d] [that] this duty
included, among other things, the duty to design, implement, maintain, and test Sony’s security
system in order to ensure Plaintiff’s Personal Information was adequately secured and protected”);
William Dalsen, Comment, Civil Remedies for Invasions of Privacy: A Perspective on Software
Vendors and Intrusion upon Seclusion, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 1059, 1063 (2009).
230. See In re Sony, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 972.
231. Dalsen, supra note 229, at 1063.
232. Id.
233. See, e.g., Daly v. Metro. Life Ins., 782 N.Y.S.2d 530, 535 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004).
234. In 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court chose not to redefine the economic loss rule to allow
recovery under a federal cause of action despite the nonexistence of concrete harm. Spokeo Inc.
v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) (“Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in
the context of a statutory violation.”)
235. For a thorough discussion on the different common law and state-specific statutory
exceptions to the economic loss doctrine in a consumer data breach class action, see In re Sony,
996 F. Supp. 2d at 966–73; cf. Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Extending Learned
Hand’s Negligence Formula to Information Security Breaches, 3 I/S 237, 268 n.139 (2007)
(noting that plaintiffs have not been successful in “side-stepping” the economic loss rule in data
breach cases premised on negligence).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol69/iss3/3

38

Mills and Harclerode: Privacy, Mass Intrusion and the Modern Data Breach

2017]

PRIVACY, MASS INTRUSION, AND THE MODERN DATA BREACH

809

are reluctant to recognize data as legal property.236 Further, if the victim
suffers no financial harm—for example, when a credit card loss is
covered by the card company—there is no “economic loss.” As a result,
data breach victims suing under negligence are frequently unsuccessful
in surviving motions to dismiss.237
The economic loss rule does not always operate as a total bar to
negligence claims. Compensatory damages have been successfully
sought against corporate data custodians under theories that held the
custodians to a standard to exercise reasonable care of the data regardless
of direct economic loss.238 In some states, noneconomic damages have
been permitted in a data breach negligence cause of action. For example,
in the recent Target data breach class action, negligence claims survived
Target’s initial motion to dismiss under Georgia, D.C., Idaho, and New
Hampshire law.239 However, in 2016, the Third Circuit ruled that the
economic loss doctrine barred a plaintiff from claiming negligence after
a data breach.240
Plaintiffs also face justiciability issues such as standing and ripeness
when suing in negligence or any other common law action. Many data
breach victims can only allege the mere threat of identity theft or other
speculative damages rather than particularized damages, such as a dollar
amount lost by someone utilizing their personal profile. In other words,
it is difficult to assign value to the harm caused in a data breach where
the victim has suffered no particular loss. In light of the recent U.S.
Supreme Court decision in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA,241
which reemphasized the need for a threatened injury to be “certainly
impending” to meet standing requirements,242 more recent cases have
followed the traditional stringent approach to standing.243 For example,
in 2015, a New Jersey federal court denied standing to plaintiffs who had
236. See Douglas H. Meal & David T. Cohen, Private Data Security Breach Litigation in
the United States, ASPATORE, https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:a4I5Jit
356YJ:https://www.ropesgray.com/~/media/Files/articles/2014/February/Meal%2520Chapter.as
hx+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us (last visited Mar. 10, 2017).
237. Id.
238. See In re Sony, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 966–73.
239. In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 64 F. Supp. 3d 1304, 1314 (D.
Minn. 2014). However, the development of the economic loss rule in Alaska, California, Illinois,
Iowa, and Massachusetts required the court’s dismissal of certain negligence claims brought by
plaintiffs from these states. Id.
240. Longenecker-Wells v. Benecard Servs. Inc., No. 15-3538, 2016 WL 4474701, at *1–2
(3d Cir. Aug. 25, 2016).
241. 113 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
242. Id. at 1147.
243. See, e.g., Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins., 998 F. Supp. 2d 646, 655–56 (S.D. Ohio
2014), rev’d and remanded, Nos. 15-3386/3387, 2016 WL 4728027, at *1 (6th Cir. Sept. 12,
2016).
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their PII and PHI stolen as part of a breach that affected 800,000 patients,
and also denied standing to the one plaintiff in the consolidated class
action that actually suffered from identity theft after the breach.244
Nevertheless, some courts have found that the credible threat of harm
resulting from a data breach is enough to satisfy standing requirements.245
The issue of individual remedy or recovery as a victim of a data breach
with no defined loss remains uncertain territory.
B. Fair Credit Report Act Claims
To invoke subject matter jurisdiction in federal courts, data breach
plaintiffs have also attempted to bring a Federal Credit Reporting Act
(FCRA)246 claim against a hacked company. A FCRA claim targets the
company’s improper transfer of data to unauthorized third parties.
Pursuing this statutory violation is an effort to overcome the barrier of the
economic loss rule discussed primarily. A May 2016 U.S. Supreme Court
decision not only provided an example of this strategy, but also
reenergized plaintiffs involved in class action lawsuits that traditionally
struggle to establish actual harm.
In Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,247 Robins argued that Spokeo, a people
search website, violated FCRA by publishing inaccurate information
about him online.248 Robins’s argument focused on how the inaccurate
information negatively affected his search for a job.249 The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with Robins that the statutory
violation, as alleged, constituted actual harm sufficient to establish
standing.250 The U.S. Supreme Court did not completely agree. In a 6–2
decision, Justice Samuel Alito, writing for the majority, explained that
the allegation of an injury-of-fact requires the injury to be concrete and
244. In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., No. 13-7418 (CCC), 2015 WL
1472483, at *4–9 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2015) (dismissing the consolidated class action of plaintiffs
whose PII and PHI were stolen after two employees’ encrypted laptops were stolen).
245. See Meal & Cohen, supra note 236 (citing, inter alia, Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628
F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding plaintiffs had standing because they alleged a credible
threat of real and immediate harm of stolen personal information after a laptop was stolen); Ruiz
v. Gap, Inc., 380 F. App’x 689, 691 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding standing because risk of identity theft
from stolen laptop was “real, and not merely speculative”); Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499
F.3d 629, 634, 640 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding standing because “the injury-in-fact requirement can
be satisfied by a threat of future harm or by an act which harms the plaintiff only by increasing
the risk of future harm that the plaintiff would have otherwise faced, absent the defendant’s
actions,” but dismissing because the cost of credit monitoring is not a compensable damage).
246. Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1128 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1681
(2012)).
247. 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).
248. Id. at 1546.
249. Id. at 1554 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
250. Id. at 1544–45 (majority opinion).
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particularized.251 Because the Ninth Circuit failed to fully analyze both
of these requirements, the case would need to be reheard by the Ninth
Circuit.252 Fortunately for Robins and other data breach plaintiffs, the
Court’s ruling is not a complete bar to FCRA or other statutory claims.
The Court also recognized that the risk of harm could constitute an injuryof-fact. Justice Alito wrote:
Just as the common law permitted suit in such instances, the
violation of a procedural right granted by statute can be
sufficient in some circumstances to constitute injury in fact.
In other words, a plaintiff in such a case need not allege any
additional harm beyond the one Congress has identified.253
Unfortunately, this decision also does not completely clarify this
murky issue. Without a clear path, plaintiffs continue to pursue creative
litigation strategies based on the hope afforded by the Supreme Court.254
After rehearing the Spokeo case, the Ninth Circuit provided plaintiff and
defense counsel alike with little certainty in regard to when the violation
of a federal statute gives rise to a concrete injury.255 While a unanimous
Ninth Circuit panel ruled that Robins had Article III standing because the
statutory violation implicated his “concrete interests in truthful credit
reporting,” the court also recognized that “determining whether any given
inaccuracy in a credit report would help or harm an individual (or perhaps
both) is not always easily done.”256 Thus, courts still have significant
discretion when analyzing whether a FCRA or other statutory violation
gives rise to Article III standing, and plaintiffs will continue to have to
test these limits.
C. Privacy Torts
Affected individuals may also turn to privacy torts to redress their
injuries. There are four different traditional privacy torts: (1) intrusion
upon seclusion; (2) public disclosure of private facts; (3) appropriation of
name or likeness; and (4) publicity placing a person in false light.257
251. Id. at 1547–50.
252. Id. at 1550.
253. Id. at 1549.
254. Compare Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins., Nos. 15-3386/3387, 2016 WL 4728027, at
*3–6 (6th Cir. Sept. 12, 2016) (holding that the plaintiffs could continue their class action suits
based on negligence, bailment, and FCRA violations without establishing that their customer data
had been misused), with Braitberg v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 836 F.3d 925, 930 (8th Cir. 2016)
(holding that the plaintiff’s Cable Communications Policy Act claim could not meet the Spokeo
bar because the retention of consumer data did not cause the plaintiff any definite harm).
255. See Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2017).
256. Id. at 1116–17.
257. JON L. MILLS, PRIVACY IN THE NEW MEDIA AGE 42–44 (2015).
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Though the damages flowing from a data breach may concern all of these
violations of privacy, the first two traditional torts are most applicable.
Intrusion upon seclusion protects an individual’s “spatial” privacy,
which can be violated without disclosure or publication of the
individual’s data because the commission of the tort is the intrusion
itself.258 The intrusion does not have to be physical259 and may be a
breach of a persons’ “digital space.”260 In order to prevail under the
intrusion upon seclusion tort, the data breach victim must satisfy the tort’s
three elements: (1) the intrusion was intentional; (2) the act intruded upon
matters that the data breach victim reasonably expected would remain
private; and (3) the intrusive act was highly offensive to the reasonable
person.261 Unlike a negligence cause of action, proof of damages is not
an element of the intrusion upon seclusion tort. The economic loss rule
also does not apply, so data breach victims may bring the action even
when the damage is not purely economic. However, traditional
justiciability requirements still apply to limit suits based on speculative
injuries.
The third element of this privacy tort—whether the intrusive act was
highly offensive to the reasonable person—is a shifting target and
difficult to standardize. An intrusion that resulted in the dissemination of
a person’s health information protected by federal regulations such as
HIPAA would likely offend a reasonable person. As would an intrusion
that resulted in the dissemination of any sort of data protected by the
patchwork of regulations previously discussed,262 such as the unlawful
disclosure of an individual’s credit card information. However,
dissemination of an aggregated set of individual data points that are
readily available to the public—such as an address, telephone number,
age, and name—may not be so objectively offensive in light of the fact
that the information collected was public. The intentionality element of
this privacy tort also presents a problem for the average data breach
victim seeking to sue the data custodian rather than the hacker, simply
because most data custodians never intend for a data breach to occur.
Hackers would meet the intentionality standard, but are more difficult to
sue because they are frequently anonymous and may not have any assets
to collect with a judgment.263
258. Id. at 42.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 43.
261. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
262. See supra Part III.
263. Terry Bollea, who publicly is known by his wrestler-moniker Hulk Hogan, initiated a
high-profile legal action—including invasion of privacy, publication of private facts, violation of
the right of publicity, and intentional infliction of emotional distress—against Gawker after the
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The tort of public disclosure of private facts requires the actual
publication of facts that are so sensitive and personal that a reasonable
person would object to their publication.264 This action may only be
brought by a natural person, not a corporation.265 Unlike an intrusion
upon seclusion claim, this tort does not require proof that the
dissemination of the public facts was intentional.266 Again, the data
custodian who loses data due to a computer hacking did not actually
“publish” the information. Usually if the information was published, the
hacker or someone to whom the hacker disclosed the information
published it.
For example, in Randolph v. ING Life Insurance & Annuity Co.,267 the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals determined that an insurance
company did not “publish” personal information stolen from the
company when a thief stole one of the insurance company’s computers
containing a trove of personal information.268 Similarly, in Galaria v.
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,269 a federal district court judge in
Ohio held that the publicity requirement was not met when a data breach
resulted in the theft of personal information by a hacker.270 The class of
plaintiffs in Galaria had given personally identifiable information to
Nationwide Insurance in the course of purchasing insurance products and
other services from Nationwide, but later found out that the information
had been stolen when Nationwide’s computer network was hacked.271
Like most data breach scenarios, the hackers were never found, and the
only plausible defendant for seeking a remedy for the invasion of privacy
caused by the data breach was the data custodian, Nationwide Insurance,
and it could not be held liable.

website posted excerpts of a sex tape featuring the former wrestler accompanied with a written
report that detailed and commented on the sex tape. Bollea claimed he did not release the tape and
Gawker maintained that they received the tape anonymously. Without the original leaker/intruder
to go after, Bollea targeted, and eventually took down, the popular website. Gawker Media, LLC
v. Bollea, 129 So. 3d 1196 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014); see also Sydney Ember, Gawker and
Hulk Hogan Reach $31 Million Settlement, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/03/business/media/gawker-hulk-hogan-settlement.html.
264. MILLS, supra note 257, at 43.
265. Id. at 46.
266. Id. at 43.
267. 973 A.2d 702 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
268. Id. at 710.
269. 998 F. Supp. 2d 646 (S.D. Ohio 2014), rev’d and remanded, Nos. 15-3386/3387, 2016
WL 4728027, at *1 (6th Cir. Sept. 12, 2016).
270. Id. at 663.
271. Id. at 650.
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D. Unjust Enrichment
Unjust enrichment is an equitable theory of law rooted in contract law
principles.272 The essential element of unjust enrichment is that the
plaintiff actually conferred an unjust benefit on the defendant.273 A data
breach defendant that came into possession of the plaintiff’s data without
having received any remuneration from the plaintiff—in the form of the
plaintiff purchasing something from the defendant, for example—will
likely be immune from an unjust enrichment claim bought by the data
breach victim. Data breach victims who have brought successful unjust
enrichment causes of action against data custodians had each bought a
product or service from the data custodian.274 Thus, if the victim
purchased a product, such as a video game or some clothes, liability may
be possible.
Unjust enrichment may also be asserted by corporate employees
against a corporate data custodian that opportunistically failed to protect
employee data. In Enslin v. Coca-Cola Co.,275 former employee Shane
Enslin brought a class action against Coca-Cola following the theft of
several company laptops that contained PII and the subsequent identity
theft that Enslin endured.276 The U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania dismissed most of Enslin’s claims, but allowed
his unjust enrichment claim to move forward.277 The court agreed that
Enslin had fairly alleged the existence of an express or implied agreement
that the company would protect the employee’s PII as a result of the
employee’s acceptance of the employment contract.278 Essentially, the
company failed to implement adequate security measures to protect from
the theft and benefited from employee labor while doing so.
E. Violation of Trade Secrets
During the recent rash of data breaches, an avalanche of commercial
information were divulged, including private communications, strategies,
272. See In re Zappos.com, Inc., No. 3:12–cv–00325–RCJ–VPC, 2013 WL 4830497, at *4
(D. Nev. Sept. 9, 2013).
273. Id.
274. See In re Target Corp. Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1178 (D. Minn.
2014) (accepting the plausibility of plaintiff’s “would not have shopped” theory which alleged
that Target should have not received plaintiffs’ money when plaintiffs would not have spent
money at Target if they had known about the breach); see also Meal & Cohen, supra note 236
(citing Bell v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., No. 12-CV-09475 BRO (PJWx), slip op. at 7–8 (C.D. Cal.
July 11, 2013) (where video game consumers alleged violations of the video game developer’s
privacy policy)).
275. 136 F. Supp. 3d 654 (E.D. Pa. 2015).
276. Id. at 658–60.
277. Id. at 669–80.
278. Id. at 674–75.
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customer lists, movie scripts, marketing ideas, and other commercial
secrets. Some of the disclosures were protectable intellectual property
and others were just embarrassing private files. Determining whether the
commercial information qualifies as protectable intellectual property
turns on the distinct characteristics outlined by the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act (UTSA). The criteria are: (1) the information is subject to reasonable
measures to maintain its secrecy and (2) by remaining secret, the
information confers a competitive advantage on its owner.279 Examples
of information protected under trade secret are the formula for CocaCola, proprietary customer lists, and copyrighted material such as an
unreleased motion picture or script. While some items are clearly
protectable intellectual property, the vulnerability for breach and the
ability to share stolen information widely almost instantly creates a
difficult setting to enforce trade secret laws.
In some instances, the existing law will protect against the
redistribution of trade secrets. Under UTSA, anyone who steals valid
trade secret property can be liable for the loss and resulting damages, and
trade secret owners can seek injunctions to prevent disclosure.280 In the
right circumstances, even a republication of a trade secret exposed by a
data breach may be a violation of UTSA. This protection from further
republication would likely depend on the content of the trade secret and
the extent of the republication.281
Despite the fact that the Bartnicki court specifically rejected a blanket
First Amendment protection for the republication of trade secrets, 282 an
innocent third party may be protected and allowed to publish a stolen
trade secret if it deals with a matter of public concern. For example, in
CBS Inc. v. Davis283 the U.S. Supreme Court adopted the view that
disclosure of a trade secret was protected speech if it was related to public
health and safety.284 The Court overturned a preliminary injunction that
would have prevented CBS from broadcasting undercover footage of a
meat packing facility, which included trade secrets, despite CBS’s

279. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i)–(ii) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N amended 1985).
280. Id. § 2(a).
281. In Bartnicki, the Court identified limits to First Amendment protection of republished
material, particularly information of public importance. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533
(2001). The Court suggested that republishing trade secrets may not qualify as protected speech,
as they would fail the prong of Bartnicki requiring the information to be of public importance:
“We need not decide whether that interest is strong enough to justify the application of § 2511(c)
to disclosures of trade secrets or domestic gossip or other information of purely private concern.”
Id.
282. Id.
283. 510 U.S. 1315 (1994).
284. Id. at 1318.
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“calculated misdeeds” in obtaining the footage.285 This result should be
no surprise. Under the Bartnicki balancing test,286 even stolen
information is provided with First Amendment republication protection
if the information has significant public importance. It is unclear what the
outcome would be if the stolen information was insignificant but just as
intrusive. In that case, trade secret protection might apply.
When trade secrets are treated more as property than information, the
plaintiff’s chances to stop republication improve because the breach and
publication are considered a theft or misappropriation of an identifiable
asset rather than pure speech.287 Simply put, property rights do not face
the same test for publication as information under the First Amendment.
The California Supreme Court tacitly accepted this argument in DVD
Copy Control Ass’n v. Bunner288 and ultimately held that an injunction
prohibiting the online publication of a trade secret (a code for breaking
DVD encryption technology) did not constitute an unlawful prior
restraint.289 However, as discussed, the argument to prohibit online
publication is considerably weakened if the trade secret owner is seeking
post-disclosure injunctive relief. Accordingly, although a trade secret
posted on an obscure website may be protected from publication under
UTSA, a loss of trade secret status will likely occur if it is widely
distributed online. Likely due to these considerations, the California
Court of Appeal for the Sixth District reversed the granting of the
preliminary injunction in Bunner because the technology had since lost
its trade secret status after continued online publication on several
different popular websites.290
Policymakers should work to redefine misuse of trade secrets to
include republication, and to reclassify stolen sensitive information as
property or protectable information, unless there is a public interest for
disclosure. Until policies change or court interpretations evolve, the
epidemic of data breaches will continue to facilitate substantial harm to
corporations as well as mass privacy intrusions on individuals.

285. Id. at 1315–18.
286. See discussion supra pp. 789–91.
287. See Pamela Samuelson, Principles for Resolving Conflicts Between Trade Secrets and
the First Amendment, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 777, 799–805 (2006).
288. 75 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2003).
289. Id. at 17–19. Once again demonstrating that matters of public concern will receive First
Amendment publication protection, the court also distinguishes between the code at issue in the
case and trade secrets involving matters of public concern. Id. at 15–16. The latter, a matter of
public concern, implicates First Amendment protection and will prevent an injunction against an
online post. Id.
290. DVD Copy Control Ass’n v. Bunner, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 185, 195–96 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
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F. Other Common Law Actions
Replevin is an action at law designed to recover a specific piece of
personal property.291 A replevin action does not seek damages for the loss
of the property, but rather the physical recovery of the property.292 If this
has applicability in a data breach scenario, a replevin action would seek
the return of the data to the data breach victim. A replevin action may
have some applicability to litigation seeking to stop dissemination of the
stolen data by the media or others. However, due to the amorphous nature
of “data,” and the courts’ reluctance to define data as any type of property,
much less personal property,293 replevin is generally not a useful action
for the data breach victim, regardless of whether the victim is an
individual or a corporation. Further, because stolen data is usually widely
republished by third parties, replevin of the original data may provide
little actual relief to the victim. A trespass to chattels remedy is similar to
replevin, except damages are sought rather than the repossession of the
stolen property.
Bailment is “the relationship that arises when personal property is
delivered to another for some particular purpose with an express or
implied contract to redeliver the property when the purpose has been
fulfilled, or to otherwise deal with the property according to the bailor’s
instructions.”294 The classic example of a bailment claim is one made
against a valet driver who refuses to deliver a patron’s car.295 Data breach
plaintiffs have attempted to apply this old common law claim to modern,
technologically complex data breach litigation scenarios.296 Yet the
transitory and quickly replicating nature of digital data may make it
impossible to “return” it to the data breach plaintiff after a disclosure or
further republication.297 Further, as discussed, most courts have not
recognized “data” as legal property.298
G. Cyber Liability Insurance
Due to the inadequate patchwork of legal remedies to fix the emerging
web of problems surrounding data breach, some corporations use cyber
liability insurance as an option to minimize seemingly inevitable

291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.

66 AM. JUR. 2D Replevin § 1, Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2016).
See id.
Meal & Cohen, supra note 236, at 7.
Id. (citing Earhart v. Callan, 221 F.2d 160, 163 (9th Cir. 1955)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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damages.299 Although such protections were traditionally used only in
high-risk industries such as healthcare and finance, many companies in a
wide range of industries are now purchasing cyber liability policies as
part of their standard operating practices.300 However, as with any
insurance scheme, coverage can be denied, and data breach insurance is
a complex area. Cyber liability insurance provides coverage for losses
and crisis management support after a breach.301 However, cyber liability
insurance is not a standalone tactic for data security, but rather one tool
in a company’s cyber security toolbox.302 Before attaining coverage,
companies are often expected to have adequate risk management
techniques already in place. If the company maintaining the data has been
negligent, it is likely that insurance coverage will be denied after the
breach, or be subject to higher premiums. However, if a company forgoes
data breach insurance, it may not be able to simply rely on its preexisting
commercial general liability policy.303 This predicament results in
increased costs and uncertain data security standards for the consumers.
Because the internet is global, the challenges for redressing data
breaches are worldwide. A data breach on a company with a multinational
reach will give rise to legal issues that cross borders.304 The European
Union and the United States are partners in many agreements and also are
home to numerous corporations who do business in both jurisdictions. It
is important to understand that these two jurisdictions, although they have
much in common, have important differences in regulating privacy and
data breaches.

299. In fact, there is a developing industry in cybersecurity insurance. See Mahendra
Ramsinghani, Can Startups Disrupt the $20 Billion Cyber Insurance Market?, TECH CRUNCH
(May 23, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/05/23/can-startups-disrupt-the-20-billion-cyberinsurance-market/.
300. Steve Durbin, Cybercrime: The Next Entrepreneurial Growth Business?, WIRED,
https://www.wired.com/insights/2014/10/cybercrime-growth-business/ (last visited Nov. 21,
2017).
301. JUDY SELBY & C. ZACHARY ROSENBERG, THOMSON REUTERS, CYBERINSURANCE:
INSURING FOR DATA BREACH RISK 1 (2014), https://www.bakerlaw.com/files/uploads/News/
Articles/LITIGATION/2014/Selby-Rosenberg-Dec-2014.pdf.
302. See Durbin, supra note 300.
303. See Zurich Am. Ins. v. Sony Corp., No. 651982/2011, 2014 WL 3253541, at *1 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Feb. 24, 2014) (holding that Sony’s insurance companies did not owe Sony coverage
under their general liability policy after the 2014 PlayStation hacks); see also Young Ha, N.Y.
Court: Zurich Not Obligated to Defend Sony Units in Data Breach Litigation, INS. J. (Mar. 17,
2014), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/east/2014/03/17/323551.htm (noting that Sony’s
commercial general liability policy did not provide coverage for data breach incident).
304. See RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., PRIVACY REVISITED: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE
RIGHT TO BE LEFT ALONE (2016).
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V. COMPARING EUROPEAN UNION AND UNITED STATES POLICIES FOR
DATA BREACHES AND PRIVACY
Because the transfer of digital information takes place on a global
scale, it is important to consider distinctions in international and crossborder privacy law. As distinguished from the United States’ treatment
of privacy as a penumbral right, the European Union treats a person’s
right to privacy as fundamental. The right to privacy is explicitly
enshrined in the European Union’s premier human rights treaty, the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).305 In the European
Union, the right to privacy is afforded the same level of legal protection
as the freedom of expression.306 Accordingly, European courts must
balance the right to privacy with the freedom of expression rather than
substantially favoring the freedom of expression like courts in the United
States.307 The impact of this balance is noticeable in both European case
law, which sets forth the “right to be forgotten,” and legislative reform,
including the incoming General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and
EU-U.S. Privacy Shield.
A. Privacy Law Within the European Union
Arising from a more equal balancing between privacy and speech,
Europeans treat the issue of prior restraint differently from the United
States. Although European courts are hesitant to enjoin speech,308 the line
appears to be drawn with a less liberal interpretation than in the United
States. In the case of Mouvement Raëlien Suisse v. Switzerland,309 the
Court upheld Swiss authorities’ decision to ban a Raelian poster from
display along public highways, weighing the harm of the controversial
material over the speakers’ religious freedom.310 Previous cases in
Europe have banned similar content, such as Nazi paraphernalia, under
circumstances that would not justify banning the same content in the
United States.311
305. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8, Nov.
4, 1950, 1955 U.N.T.S. 222.
306. Id. art. 10.
307. See MILLS, supra note 257, at 66–68.
308. See Yildirim v. Turkey, 2012-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 505, 542–43 (holding that the Turkish
government could not block access to an academic website where plaintiff expressed controversial
political views).
309. 2012-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 373, 441–43, 447.
310. Since the Raelian movement stood in favor of principles like “human cloning,
geniocracy, and sensual meditation” (often predicated on viewing the child as a privileged sexual
object), the court held that there were sufficient public interest grounds to justify the government’s
refusal to allow the poster to be displayed along the highway. Id.
311. French web users were accessing online auction websites in the United States to
purchase Nazi memorabilia. See Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et l’Antisemitisme,
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While the European Union may enforce some privacy components
more strictly than the United States, the test to determine the legality of
disclosure is strikingly similar to the test developed in Bartnicki. In Axel
Springer AG v. Germany,312 the European Court of Human Rights
provided an analysis for determining whether a ban on the publication of
an arrest and conviction of a well-known actor violated Article 10 of the
ECHR. That Court evaluated (1) whether the event published was of
general interest; (2) whether the person concerned was a public figure;
and (3) how the information was obtained and whether it was reliable.313
Similar to the Bartnicki holding, the Court found in favor of publication
because the actor was well known and the information was only
published after the prosecuting authorities’ disclosure.314 Again, freedom
of expression triumphed over the right to privacy.
In a 2014 ruling, however, the Court of Justice of the European Union
ruled that the fundamental right to personal privacy overrides, as a rule,
not only the economic interest of the operator of the search engine but
also the interest of the general public in accessing information online.315
Upholding the right to be forgotten, the Court ruled that Google must
comply with EU data protection rules and remove a link for a digitized
article that accurately detailed the foreclosure of the plaintiff’s home.316
Since 2014, Google has accepted more than 1 million URL removal
requests (56.8% of all requests are approved).317 The company reviews
each request on a case by case basis following the Article 29 Working
Party’s guidelines318 which require removal if the content is “inadequate,
irrelevant or no longer relevant, or excessive . . . in the light of the time
that has elapsed.”319 Google refused to apply a French order requesting

169 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1192–93 (N.D. Cal. 2001), rev’d, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006); see also
MILLS, supra note 257, at 90–91 (analyzing the Yahoo!, Inc. decision during a conflict of laws
discussion).
312. 2012 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 18, 27–30, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/webservices/content/pdf/001109034?TID=ihgdqbxnfi.
313. Id. at 27–30.
314. Id. at 30–33.
315. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, 2014
EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 317 (May 13, 2014).
316. Id.
317. Transparency Report: Search Removals Under European Privacy Law, GOOGLE,
https://transparencyreport.google.com/eu-privacy/overview (last visited Aug. 24, 2017).
318. ARTICLE 29 DATA PROT. WORKING PARTY, GUIDELINES ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION JUDGMENT ON “GOOGLE SPAIN AND INC. V. AGENCIA
ESPAÑOLA DE PROTECCIÓN DE DATOS (AEPD) AND MARIO COSTEJA GONZÁLEZ” C-131/12 (2014),
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinionrecommendation/files/2014/wp225_en.pdf.
319. Google Spain SL, 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS.
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worldwide removal of the contested data.320 After years in the legal
system, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) is set to hear the case, and
the outcome will likely determine scope, potency, and longevity of the
right to be forgotten—whether offending content must be taken down
only in the requesting country, throughout the EU, or worldwide.321 The
evolution of European privacy law impacts not only member-nations
within the EU, but also companies within the United States that engage
in transatlantic business operations.
B. Transatlantic Data Security Standards
Major changes to European data regulatory structures were voted into
place in 2016, and are set for implementation in May 2018. Data
controllers and processors around the globe are currently reconsidering
their data management practices and international data transfers to
comply with the incoming GDPR322 and EU-U.S. Privacy Shield.323
Traditionally, the Data Protection Directive (the Directive) provided
standards for all government and private entities that process EU
employee or consumer data, as distinguished from the sector-specific
approach in the United States.324 The Directive also imposed strict
requirements on non-EU countries that received personal data from EU
citizens.325 In the event of a data breach, the Directive imposed a duty on
data processors326 to notify the data controller,327 and the controller to
communicate the breach to the data subjects without delay.328
Until 2016, the European Commissions permitted U.S. companies to
avoid some of these requirements as long as the companies abided by the
Safe Harbor Principles.329 After a push for stronger privacy protections
320. Julia Fioretti, Google Refuses French Order to Apply ‘Right to be Forgotten’ Globally,
REUTERS (July 31, 2015, 5:01 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/31/us-google-franceidUSKCN0Q50VP20150731.
321. Alex Hern, ECJ to Rule on Whether ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ Can Stretch Beyond EU,
GUARDIAN (July 20, 2017, 5:19 EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jul/20/ecjruling-google-right-to-be-forgotten-beyond-eu-france-data-removed.
322. See Commission Regulation 16/679, arts. 94, 99, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 86, 87 (EU).
323. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, EU-U.S. PRIVACY SHIELD FRAMEWORK PRINCIPLES 6
(2016), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/privacy-shield-adequacy-decision-annex2_en.pdf.
324. See Council Directive 95/46, art. 2(d), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 38 (EC).
325. See id. art. 25.
326. ‘“[P]rocessor’ shall mean a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other
body which processes personal data on behalf of the controller . . . .” Id. art. 2(e).
327. The “data controller” is the party primarily responsible for compliance. Id. art. 2(d).
328. Id. arts. 12, 17.
329. The seven Safe Harbor privacy principles are notice, choice, transfer to third parties,
access, security, data integrity, and enforcement. See Federal Trade Commission Enforcement of
the U.S.-EU and U.S.-Swiss Safe Harbor Frameworks, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Dec. 2012),
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by EU citizens and the courts,330 the Directive was replaced by the GDPR
and the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield replaced Safe Harbor. However, unlike
the Directive, which allowed each member country to decide how to
apply standards, the GDPR is law that applies uniformly to all EU
countries and reaches foreign companies dealing in EU data.331
The GDPR will apply to any company worldwide that processes or
controls personal data332 of an EU resident in connection to (1) offering
goods or services, or (2) monitoring behavior.333 Before the GDPR comes
into effect on May 25, 2018, companies will need to assess what kinds of
structural changes will be necessary to ensure compliance, chiefly
providing notice and consent to EU data subjects.334 Most companies will
need to appoint a Data Protection Officer (DPO), and many companies
will also need to appoint a local representative to be located in the
European Union.335 If a data breach occurs, DPOs will be required to
notify a data protection authority within seventy-two hours of the breach,
ideally within twenty-four hours.336 While there will be many issues
related to jurisdiction, the GDPR permits EU residents to pursue legal
action against any data processor or controller, including those located in
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/federal-trade-commissionenforcement-us-eu-us-swiss-safe-harbor.
330. See European Union Press Release No. 117/15, The Court of Justice Declares That the
Commission’s US Safe Harbour Decision Is Invalid ¶¶ 4, 11–12 (Oct. 6, 2015),
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2015-10/cp150117en.pdf (finding that
American companies’ mere compliance with the United States’s Safe Harbor provisions is not,
by itself, adequate protection in Europe and may still leave these companies exposed to liability).
331. The CJEU deemed Safe Harbor framework inadequate in the case because the crossborder transfer of personal data by Facebook did not provide a level of data protection essentially
equivalent to that of the European Union. Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2015
EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 650; see also John Naughton, Data-Hucksters Beware – Online Privacy
Is Making a Comeback, GUARDIAN (Aug. 20, 2017, 1:59 EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2017/aug/20/data-hucksters-beware-online-privacy-eu-general-data-protectionregulation.
332. “Personal Data” is defined as any information relating to the subject. Commission
Regulation 16/679, art. 4(1) 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 33 (EU).
333. Id. art. 3(2).
334. Id.
335. Id. arts. 27, 37.
336. Id. art. 33. In addition to data breach requirements under the GDPR, in 2016, the
European Parliament passed the Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive, which
imposes additional reporting requirements on companies following a breach. The NIS Directive
targets entities that provide essential services, such as the energy, health, finance, and
transportation sectors, and digital service providers. Council Directive 16/1148, arts. 4(4), 5(2),
2016 O.J. (L 194) 1, 13, 14 (EU). Similar to the GDPR, the NIS Directive applies to companies
outside of the European Union if the company offers services within the European Union. Id. art.
18. If a company falls within one of the regulated sectors and is breached, the company is then
required to notify the relevant authorities regardless of whether the breach exposed personal data.
Id. arts. 14, 16.
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the United States, alleged to be in violation of the GDPR.337
Administrative fines for violations of the GDPR will operate in a twotiered system, with the most egregious data breaches incurring fines of
up to 4% of global annual turnover—up to €20 million.338 Factors for
determining the fine include, but are not limited to, the nature of
infringement, intentionality or negligence, mitigating factors taken by the
data controller, and nature of the personal data.339
The EU-U.S. Privacy Shield will protect personal data in transfers
between EU residents and U.S. companies, while encouraging the flow
of data between U.S. companies and the European Union.340 The FTC
will monitor U.S. companies subject to the Privacy Shield stateside.341
The Privacy Shield protects personal data by imposing requirements on
organizations for their data collection, management, and consumer
transparency practices.342 U.S. companies must provide notice to EU data
subjects on data use and recourse available, provide choice of opt-out of
data collection or opt-in for sharing sensitive data,343 and must take
reasonable and appropriate security measures to protect personal data
from “loss, misuse and unauthorized access, disclosure, alteration and
destruction, taking into due account the risks involved in the processing
and the nature of the personal data.”344 Consistent with principles of data
minimization, companies must limit collection of personal data to what
is relevant to the purpose.345 Companies must also allow data subjects
access to their own data and the ability to correct or amend it where
reasonable, and must make available independent recourse mechanisms
in the event of breach.346 Additionally, companies must limit data use and
transfers to third parties consistent with purpose provided in notice, and
are accountable for third-party organizations receiving data transfers,
337. Commission Regulation 16/679, art. 79, at 80.
338. Kuan Hon, GDPR: Potential Fines for Data Security Breaches More Severe for Data
Controllers
Than
Processors,
REGISTER
(May
12,
2016,
8:33
AM),
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/05/12/gdpr_potential_fines_for_data_security_breaches_mor
e_severe_for_data_controllers_than_processors_says_expert/.
339. Commission Regulation 16/679, art. 83, at 82.
340. See W. Gregory Voss, The Future of Transatlantic Data Flows: Privacy Shield or
Bust?, 19 J. INTERNET L. 1, 10 (2016).
341. European Commission Press Release MEMO/16/434, EU-U.S. Privacy Shield:
Frequently Asked Questions (Feb. 29, 2016), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16434_en.htm.
342. See id.
343. Sensitive data is not specifically defined but generally includes personal data about
medical history, health, race or ethnic origin, political, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade
union membership, or sex life. Voss, supra note 340, at 9.
344. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 323, at 6.
345. See Voss, supra note 340, at 13.
346. See id.
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ensuring the third party takes steps to comply with the Privacy Shield.347
U.S. companies can self-certify that they abide by EU data privacy
standards, which track the seven principles established in the Directive.348
VI. RESPONSES TO DATA BREACHES AND THE FUTURE OF DATA BREACH
LAW AND POLICY
The specific responses to a data breach must be rapid and organized.
Of the two classes of victims affected—individuals and the corporate
entities that hold these individuals’ private informationthe corporations
have the principal duty to maintain security of individuals’ information.
A. The Corporation
Corporations have the duty and the opportunity to reduce their
exposure to harmful breaches and reduce the damage to the individuals
whose information they hold. Any entity that possesses information—
whether it be sensitive corporate information or the personal information
of customers and/or employees—should, at a minimum, implement the
following practices:
1. monitor the guidance and rules provided by the federal and state
agencies regulating their industry, including the guidance
promulgated within enforcement actions, presentations, and
agency editorials or blog posts;
2. apply up-to-date technical standards, such as the NIST industry
standards;
3. develop and adopt adequate data collection and security plans that
are constantly reviewed against regulatory requirements and
actions at both the state and federal level; and
4. repeatedly test all data collection and security plans.
Essentially, corporations must heed the FTC’s advice by starting and
sticking with security.349 To build an even stronger program, corporations
should conduct internal investigations that test their own policies.
Supervisors can test their employees with benign spear phishing exercises
in order to ensure that every employee is equipped to handle malicious
attacks. Corporate counsel can draft monthly data security reminders and
run tabletop exercises that simulate a breach experience. These

347. See id. at 15.
348. The Framework’s seven privacy principles are notice, choice, accountability for onward
transfer, security, data integrity and purpose limitation, access, and recourse. See U.S. DEP’T OF
COMMERCE, supra note 323, at 4–6.
349. See supra notes 128, 130 and accompanying text.
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evaluations should occur as frequently as possible with a goal of constant
improvement.
Once a breach occurs, the breached entity is in crisis mode but should
have a plan to follow and follow quickly. The corporation or breached
entity must assess the problem, issue internal notifications, freeze all
evidence surrounding the breach, perform its legal obligations to affected
individuals based on applicable law, and then pursue its legal remedies,
some of which might require mounting defenses against the individuals
its policies were designed to protect. Some of these responses may
include offensive legal actions against negligent providers or others who
caused the breach. As demonstrated by the graphic below, the legal
landscape is treacherous.350

The landscape can become even more treacherous if the breach
reaches valuable commercial information. The corporate entity must be
ready to enjoin or, at the least, reduce publication in the media and online.
The loss of trade secret status because of predictable republication in the
current digital age seems to be a seriously harsh penalty if the corporation
made all efforts to sustain confidentiality of the information. The legal
and practical problem is that the republishers may be clueless and
blameless, only repeating what they see posted online. However, the
harm to the corporation is the same as if the data were stolen and
distributed by corporate espionage.
But the corporation must make an effort to defend valuable trade
secrets. If a trade secret has been widely republished at no fault of the
350. Pedro Allende, Data Security Law: Foundations, Workshop Presentation at the Privacy
+ Security Forum (Oct. 24, 2016) (on file with authors).
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trade secret holder and has subsequently lost trade secret status under
UTSA, in lieu of an injunction prohibiting all publication by any
publisher, courts could instead order a targeted delisting of the trade
secret from search engines. This type of search engine takedown is the
method utilized by the European Union’s right to be forgotten policy.351
This policy reflects the logic used in “search engine optimization,” which
focuses on the primary sources used to research information or
individuals—i.e., the principal search engines such as Google, Yahoo, or
Bing.352 While this proposal has less First Amendment concerns than an
all-encompassing injunction on the publication of information, it still
may not provide the relief that many trade secret holders seek.
Another proposed remedy to this situation is a takedown system akin
to that of intellectual property takedowns under the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA). The DMCA353 has worked to enable the
removal of information located on ISPs through specific notice. The same
type of process could work for trade secrets, and trade secret scholars
have long advocated for an improved trade secret takedown process
modeled after the DMCA.354 One such suggestion would require ISPs to
remove the publication of alleged misappropriated trade secrets from
their site within a few hours after being notified of the infringing
material.355 Then, the original complainant would have a week to a file
an official complaint with the court.356 The takedown notice would be
accompanied by a bond or fee to minimize potential frivolous
complaints.357 Some First Amendment concerns would be alleviated by
an exception for established news organizations, which would exempt
such sites from the accelerated takedown process altogether.358 While
such a process may limit the digital republication of valuable information,
it does not necessarily escape the continuing criticisms lodged against the
DMCA. Just as the DMCA suffers from the lack of a take-down-and-

351. See supra text accompanying notes 315–17.
352. See What Is SEO / Search Engine Optimization?, SEARCH ENGINE LAND,
http://searchengineland.com/guide/what-is-seo (last visited Jan. 17, 2017).
353. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3) (2012). Section 512 of the DMCA requires that the takedown
request be in writing, be signed by the copyright owner or agent, identify the infringed work,
identify the material that is infringing the work, include contact information for the copyright
owner, have a statement of good faith and accuracy, and have a statement that the complaining
party is authorized to proceed in the takedown request. See id.
354. See Elizabeth Rowe, Introducing a Takedown for Trade Secrets on the Internet, 2007
WIS. L. REV. 1041, 1043 (2007).
355. Id. at 1061–62.
356. See id. at 1062.
357. Id. at 1063.
358. Id. at 1065–66, 1071–84.
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stay-down approach,359 a trade secret takedown process could become
unmanageable if the online posting frenzy has already started. Further,
the First Amendment concerns are not completely solved by the
established media exception, especially considering that what constitutes
media and public interest changes and expands every day.
Regardless, creating an effective trade secret takedown process is
important because it directly relates to the impact of removing
information from the internet—a critical problem that has yet to be
overcome in current data breaches. Pragmatically, data breaches are
going to deal with information that is somehow made available to
unauthorized sources. It may be on the dark web, as in the Ashley
Madison breach;360 it may be in the hands of journalists, as in the HSBC
breach;361 or it may be published on a website, as in the Sony breach.362
In all of these cases, a major issue facing companies is preventing further
republication after an initial criminal breach, which commonly discloses
important trade secrets as well as intrusive personal disclosures that affect
individuals.
B. The Individual
Individuals, like corporations, face numerous hurdles when preparing
for and responding to a data breach. Both also face massive consequences
if a breach occurs, but the landscape for individuals is significantly less
defined. The central difficulties that individuals must learn to navigate
fall primarily into two categories:
1. Understanding and implementing the necessary steps to
protect against harm caused by data breaches; and
2. Determining whether to pursue legal action.
For many practitioners, the most pressing issues for affected
individuals revolve around the efficacy of legal action. However,
realistically, most individuals are rightfully consumed with the task of
protecting themselves before and immediately in the aftermath of the
breach. Simply put, they cannot wait for the legal system to provide them
359. Copyright holders are limited in only targeting the takedown of infringing material
posted by a particular user on a specific website. There is no blanket takedown process for
copyrighted material posted by multiple users on multiple websites, thus creating an excruciating
process comparable to the children’s game Whack-A-Mole. See Stephen Carlisle, DMCA
“Takedown” Notices: Why “Takedown” Should Become “Take Down and Stay Down” and Why
It’s Good for Everyone, NOVA SE. U. (July 23, 2014), http://copyright.nova.edu/dmca-takedownnotices/.
360. See supra Subsection I.B.6.
361. See supra Subsection I.B.5.
362. See supra Subsection I.B.3.
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with adequate relief. Instead, individuals must adopt their own security
measures to better protect themselves against identity theft and other
post-breach consequences. While corporations and courts drag their feet,
individuals can implement simple techniques, such as the use of complex
and unique passwords, to better secure their digital activities. Shifting
these responsibilities to the individual should not be the ultimate solution,
but adopting stronger personal security measure is a practice, and it could
mean the difference between a breach ruining a life or being a minor
inconvenience.
Of course, individuals should also have the opportunity to pursue
legal remedies by seeking relief in tort, breach of contract, or through
statutory damages. Whether through statutory claims such as the FCRA
claim in Spokeo363 or a negligence complaint, it is critical that plaintiffs
employ creative legal strategies in order to overcome the barriers to relief
from the effects of data breaches. Although there have been notable
successes for individuals in class action litigation like the Target
action,364 and in cases where negligence of the breached entity is clear,
barriers such as standing and First Amendment protections for
republication create major hurdles to an individual’s relief.
In the long term, cutting-edge litigation and serious policy reform can
provide more options for innocent victims of the mass privacy intrusions
known as data breaches. Courts must begin to better value the potentially
intrusive nature of personal data disclosures and more willing to view a
wider range of remedies.
C. The Future
The current society collects and exposes massive amounts of data
continually. These collections contain sensitive and personal information.
Reflecting this trend, the Supreme Court recognized the intrusiveness of
observing personal cell phone data in the Fourth Amendment context.
The Court stated that the warrantless search of the data contained on a
cell phone may be even more intrusive than the search of a home.365 In
his reasoning, Chief Justice John Roberts acknowledged the high value
of protecting private digital information in the search and seizure and
public safety realm.366 Just as public safety concerns compete with
privacy rights, the right to privacy competes with the First Amendment
right to publish information. The modern data breach is facilitating a mass
intrusion on corporate confidentiality and individual privacy.
363.
364.
365.
366.

See supra notes 264–71 and accompanying text.
See Stempel & Bose, supra note 37.
See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014).
See id. at 2494–95.
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Accordingly, the right of corporate trade secrets and individual’s
confidentiality must be protected in a reliable way. Further, individual
dignity and privacy must prevail. The EU approach to balancing the harm
to individual dignity against the value of public disclosure is workable
and can be supported by the logic of Bartnicki.367
Just as the republication of commercially valuable data should not be
automatically protected speech, neither should the breaches of individual
privacy by third parties or republishers of breached information. Simply
because an individual has revealed sensitive information to another does
not mean the person abandoned all privacy interests.
In the Fourth Amendment context, Justice Sonia Sotomayor
eloquently expressed the need for privacy rights when information has
been disclosed to third parties. In a data breach context, the data given to
a website, retailer, medical provider, or financial institution should not be
freely distributed by third parties after a breach makes that information
available. As Justice Sotomayor said, “[I]t may be necessary to reconsider
the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy
in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties. This approach is ill
suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information
about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane
tasks.”368
Certainly, the mere disclosure to a third party for routine life tasks
cannot be viewed as consent for the republication of information
wrongfully obtained from a data breach from that third party. That is
exactly the circumstance when a blogger or media outlet republishes
private information posted on the web by a hacker.
Victims, whether corporate or individual, must also contend with the
plaintiff’s paradox or what others have termed the “Streisand Effect”369:
litigation to vindicate privacy rights risks exposure to greater attention to
the embarrassing slanderous, intimate, commercially sensitive, or
invasive information.370 Sometimes the costs of republicizing the events
of the breach are worse than simply allowing it to disappear into the

367. See supra notes 101–03 and accompanying text.
368. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citations
omitted).
369. See T.C., What Is the Streisand Effect?, ECONOMIST (Apr. 15, 2013, 11:50 PM),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/04/economist-explains-whatstreisand-effect.
370. For example, see CTB v. News Grp. Newspapers Ltd. [2011] EWHC (QB) 1232 [2]
(Eng.), regarding the “super injunction” sought by famous soccer player Ryan Giggs to prohibit
the media from releasing not only information about his extramarital affair, but also his identity
in seeking the injunction. Ultimately the injunction became useless because social media
worldwide disclosed Giggs’s identity.
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perpetual clamor of the modern media.371 So far, corporate suits to
vindicate privacy in the form of property rights such as trade secrets have
been successful.372 Individuals who brought lawsuits to vindicate
personal privacy have seen less success, but this precedent need not
dictate the future; creative use of the privacy torts may be the most
workable vehicle moving forward. Responding to and preventing
damages from data breaches will require changes in policy and creative
litigation strategies.
Policy advancements, particularly by the FTC, have made great leaps
in protecting individual privacy and raising the standards for sensitive
data protection. However, a significant hurdle left to clear is avoiding or
mitigating harmful republication. The European Union has provided a
useful model for reform in this arena by recognizing the importance of
privacy as personal dignity. A logical extension of the Bartnicki
framework in the United States leads to the inexorable conclusion that
the republication of private facts cannot automatically be immune from
liability. New legislation seeking to limit the republication of both
valuable commercial information and individuals’ private information
could codify this Bartnicki extension and recognize the growing value of
modern privacy. Either legislation or litigation must be able to thread the
First Amendment needle to provide protection to corporations and
individuals. Until law and policy changes, the epidemic of data breaches
will continue to cause substantial harm to breached corporations and to
create mass privacy intrusions on innocent individuals.

371. Individual victims seeking anonymity while pursuing post-breach remedies may be
denied such privacy. See Emily Fiend, Ashley Madison User Must Reveal Real Name in Breach
Suit, LAW360 (Dec. 14, 2015, 8:08 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/737739/ashleymadison-user-must-reveal-real-name-in-breach-suit (describing how U.S. District Court Judge
James M. Moody, Jr. required the anonymous Ashley Madison user leading the class action to
reveal his name instead of filing under an alias).
372. E.g., DVD Copy Control Ass’n v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 1, 13–19 (Cal. 2003).
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